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After Marriage Equality:
Dual Fatherhood for Married Male
Same-Sex Couples
Jessica Feinberg*
In most states, married male same-sex couples who conceive children via
gestational surrogacy using sperm from one member of the couple and donor
ova must pursue adoption in order to establish legal parentage for the
member of the couple who is not genetically related to the child. This is
because only a minority of jurisdictions have surrogacy laws that recognize
the non-biological intended parent as a legal parent in this situation, and
across the United States cisgender male same-sex couples are excluded from
the longstanding non-adoptive marriage-based avenues of establishing
parentage currently available to both different-sex couples and female
same-sex couples. Marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage, such
as the marital presumption of parentage and spousal consent to assisted
reproduction laws, represent the most common way to establish legal
parentage in an individual other than the person who gave birth to the child.
The exclusion of male same-sex couples from marriage-based avenues of
establishing parentage is harmful, unwarranted, and unnecessary.
Parenting abilities do not depend on sexual orientation or gender. Children
raised by male same-sex couples fare just as well as children raised by
different-sex couples and female same-sex couples, and men who function
as primary caretakers to their children are as capable and effective as
women who function in that role. Excluding male same-sex couples from
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage reinforces gender-based
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stereotypes around caretaking that harm and confine women and men both
in the workplace and in the domestic sphere. Moreover, the conclusive
presumption of parentage based upon the act of giving birth, which presents
a major barrier to the extension of marriage-based avenues of establishing
parentage to male same-sex couples, is an outdated concept that fails to
reflect the realities of modern medical technology and the diverse
circumstances under which children are conceived today. This Article
advances a comprehensive proposal for extending marriage-based avenues
of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples. If implemented, the
proposal will provide a more equitable and effective legal framework for
parentage establishment.
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INTRODUCTION
As LGBTQ+ individuals and families have gained greater societal
acceptance and broader legal rights and protections in recent years,1 it
has become increasingly common for same-sex couples to welcome
children into their families.2 When this occurs, the establishment of
legal parentage for each member of the couple is critically important —
there are myriad rights, protections, and obligations that stem from a
legally recognized parent-child relationship. For example, if one
member of the couple is unable to establish legal parentage, they will
lack important parental rights relating to, inter alia, custody, visitation,
and medical decision-making. In addition, the child will be deprived of
important rights relating to, inter alia, support, inheritance, healthcare,
and social security that would stem from a legally recognized parentchild relationship.3 Historically, when a same-sex couple was raising a
child who was genetically connected to one member of the couple,
establishing parentage for the other member of the couple was difficult
and, where possible, required adoption procedures.4 Since non-adoptive
avenues of establishing parentage generally stem from either actual or
perceived genetic connections to the child or marriage to the individual
who gave birth to the child, for most of the nation’s history same-sex

1 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 680 (2015) (holding that states may
not “bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of
the opposite sex”).
2 Meredith Larson, Note, Don’t Know Much About Biology: Courts and the Rights of
Non-Biological Parents in Same-Sex Partnerships, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 869, 872 (2010)
(“In what some have termed a ‘gayby boom,’ LGBT couples and individuals are taking
advantage of [assisted reproduction] options to have children at an increasing rate.”).
3 Jessica Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward: Extending Voluntary Acknowledgments of
Parentage to Female Same-Sex Couples, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 113 (2018)
[hereinafter A Logical Step Forward].
4 Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent?: Revisiting Equitable Parenthood
Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent
Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 55-56 (2017) [hereinafter Whither the Functional Parent?].
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couples were excluded from non-adoptive avenues of establishing
parentage for the member of the couple who did not share a genetic
connection with the child.5
With the nationwide legalization of same-sex marriage,6 however,
certain categories of same-sex couples — those in which one member
of the couple is able to gestate a child (including cisgender female samesex couples as well as other same-sex couples in which one or both
members of the couple, regardless of sex or gender identity, is willing
and able to carry a child) — have gained increasing access to nonadoptive marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage.7 Marriagebased avenues of establishing parentage provide a conclusive or
rebuttable presumption of legal parentage to the spouse of the
individual who gave birth to the child.8 The common marriage-based
avenues of establishing parentage include the marital presumption of
parentage and spousal consent to assisted reproduction laws.9
Historically, the marital presumption of parentage provided a rebuttable
presumption of parentage to the husband of a woman who conceived
or gave birth to a child during the marriage.10 Spousal consent to
assisted reproduction laws generally have provided a conclusive
presumption of parentage to a husband who consents to his wife’s use
of assisted reproduction with the intent to be the resulting child’s
parent.11 The extension of these marriage-based methods of establishing
parentage to female same-sex couples has been relatively
straightforward. For female same-sex couples who wish to have a child
who shares a biological or genetic connection with at least one member
of the couple, it is common for one of the spouses to gestate and give
birth to the couple’s child.12 As a result, states have been able to extend
5

Id.
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681.
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra Part I.A.
9 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 105-06.
10 Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 562-63 (2000).
11 COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, SHANNON P. MINTER & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 3:3 (2019).
12 Female same-sex couples also may choose to have a child through reciprocal in
vitro fertilization, in which one member of the couple gestates the child and the other
member of the couple provides the ova used to conceive the child. When this occurs,
each member of the couple shares a biological or genetic connection to the child. See
Lauren B. Paulk, Embryonic Personhood: Implications for Assisted Reproductive
Technology in International Human Rights Law, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 781,
788 (2014).
6
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laws providing marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to
female same-sex couples simply by adopting gender neutral language to
refer to the person who is deemed a parent on the basis of their marriage
to the individual who gave birth.13
Cisgender male same-sex couples and other same-sex couples in
which neither party is able to gestate a child, however, continue to be
excluded from marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage.
Cisgender male same-sex couples who wish to have a child who is
genetically related to one member of the couple require the help of a
surrogate to gestate and give birth to the child.14 In the vast majority of
cases, the couple will utilize gestational surrogacy in which the
surrogate gives birth to a child who was conceived using ova from a
third-party donor and sperm from one member of the couple.15 Because
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage provide parentage on
the basis of an individual’s marriage to the person who gave birth, as
opposed to an individual’s marriage to the child’s biological parent,
male same-sex couples who conceive children via surrogacy are unable
to utilize marriage-based avenues to establish parentage.16 Furthermore,
only a minority of states have adopted surrogacy laws that recognize
both members of a male same-sex couple as legal parents when the child
is conceived via gestational surrogacy using sperm from one member of
the couple and ova from a donor.17 As a result, in most states, while the
member of a married male same-sex couple whose sperm was used to
conceive the child (the biological intended parent) often may obtain
parentage through existing paternity establishment procedures, his

13

See infra Part I.A.
Male same-sex couples in which at least one of the members is transgender may
not require the help of a third party to gestate and give birth to the child. A transgender
man may be able to gestate and give birth to the child himself. See, e.g., Nancy Coleman,
Transgender Man Gives Birth to a Boy, CNN (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/
2017/07/31/health/trans-man-pregnancy-dad-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/NA2MJVT3] (reporting the story of a transgender man who gave birth to the child he shares
with his cisgender male partner).
15 The vast majority of surrogacy arrangements today, approximately, ninety-five
percent, involve gestational surrogacy. Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy
Across America, 34 FAM. ADVOC. 32, 33 (2011), https://creativefamilyconnections.com/
wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SurrogacyAcrossAmerica.pdf?x33078 [https://perma.cc/
43M5-PNSE]. Accordingly, this Article focuses on establishing parentage in the context
of gestational surrogacy arrangements.
16 See infra Part I.C.
17 See infra Part II.A.
14
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spouse (the non-biological intended parent) must pursue adoption in
order to establish legal parentage.18
Excluding male same-sex couples from marriage-based avenues to
establishing parentage and requiring them to pursue adoption in order
to establish both members as the child’s legal parents is problematic for
a number of reasons. Adoption is often an expensive, lengthy, and
invasive process.19 Importantly, until the adoption is completed, which
may take months or longer, the non-biological intended parent is not a
legal parent.20 This leaves both the child and the non-biological
intended parent without essential rights and protections and in a state
of uncertainty.21 The exclusion of male same-sex couples from
marriage-based parentage establishment avenues also sends the harmful
message that families headed by male same-sex couples are inferior and
less deserving of legal recognition than families headed by different-sex
couples or female same-sex couples.22
The continuing exclusion of male same-sex couples from marriagebased avenues of establishing parentage likely stems both from the
conclusive presumption of legal parentage that often attaches to an
individual based upon the act of giving birth and the pervasive genderbased stereotypes and beliefs about caretaking and parenting that
continue to linger today.23 The application of a conclusive presumption
of legal parentage to the individual who gave birth creates a significant
barrier to extending marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage
to male same-sex couples. If conclusive legal parentage attaches to the
individual who gave birth, extending marriage-based parentage
presumptions to the same-sex spouse of the child’s biological father
would result in the establishment of legal parentage in at least three
people simultaneously: the individual who gave birth, the biological
father, and the biological father’s spouse. This presents a significant
problem, since the vast majority of jurisdictions only recognize a
maximum of two legal parents.24 In addition, providing individuals who
give birth with a status — conclusive legal parentage — that generally
18 Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2308 (2017) (“In
most states, nonbiological fathers in same-sex couples cannot establish parentage
without adoption, even when they are married.”).
19 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 110-11.
20 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2317-18.
21 Id. at 2318.
22 See id. at 2322-23.
23 See infra Part III.
24 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 134 (“[T]he law in the vast
majority of states recognizes a maximum of two legal parents for each child.”).
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can be voluntarily terminated only in specified, narrow circumstances
involving adoption proceedings, confines parentage establishment for
male same-sex couples who conceive via surrogacy to the realm of
adoption.25 Another significant barrier to extending marriage-based
avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples involves the
longstanding societal beliefs that women should be primarily
responsible for the domestic sphere and that women are more capable
than men at caretaking and parenting.26 Throughout the years, the law
has reflected and served to reinforce these gendered beliefs.27
These barriers, however, should not preclude the extension of
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex
couples. The conclusive presumption of parentage based upon the act
of giving birth is an outdated concept that fails to reflect the realities of
modern medical technology and the diverse circumstances under which
children are conceived today.28 Reform to make the legal parentage that
attaches to an individual based upon the act of giving birth rebuttable
in appropriate circumstances is long overdue. Moreover, the gendered
stereotypes and expectations regarding parenting abilities and
responsibilities are not only inaccurate29 but also extremely harmful to
both women and men.30 Laws that challenge and dismantle the
gendered stereotypes that continue to linger about the familial roles of
women and men, such as those that facilitate parentage establishment
for male same-sex couples, will promote greater equality both in the
workplace and in the home.31
This Article proposes that states adopt standards providing for the
rebuttal and disestablishment of the presumed legal parentage of the
individual who gave birth when the individual is not genetically related
to the child and undertook conception in conjunction with the intended
parents with the mutual intent and understanding that the intended
parents would be the child’s sole legal parents. This Article further
proposes that states amend their marriage-based avenues of establishing
parentage such that these avenues extend to the spouse of the child’s
biological, legally recognized father upon the rebuttal and
disestablishment of the presumed legal parentage of the individual who
gave birth. Extending marriage-based avenues of parentage
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

See infra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
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establishment to male same-sex couples is an essential component of
attaining equality for male same-sex couples in the parentage realm.
While advancing surrogacy laws that recognize intended parents as
legal parents regardless of gender or sexual orientation is also an
extremely important goal, many states still have not passed laws
addressing surrogacy and some states prohibit the practice.32 A
substantial number of states may find it easier or more palatable to
facilitate parentage establishment for male same-sex couples by
extending the longstanding avenues of establishing parentage that
already exist, such as marriage-based avenues, as opposed to creating
new avenues of parentage establishment, such as surrogacy-based
avenues.33 It is important to note that while this Article explores the
issue through the lens of the historical and current legal and societal
treatment of cisgender men and cisgender male same-sex couples, the
problematic, exclusionary effects of the parentage laws discussed
extend to any couple who chooses to pursue gestational surrogacy
utilizing sperm from one member of the couple and donor ova,
regardless of the gender makeup of the couple.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I provides an
overview of the non-adoptive marriage-based avenues of establishing
parentage that are available to different-sex couples and female samesex couples, but do not extend to male same-sex couples. Part II
discusses the current state of the law governing parentage establishment
for married male same-sex couples when a child is conceived via
gestational surrogacy using sperm from one member of the couple and
ova from a donor. Part III analyzes the barriers to extending marriagebased avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples,
focusing on the presumption of legal parentage that attaches to an
individual based upon the act of giving birth and the lingering genderbased stereotypes and assumptions that exist around parenting. Part IV
explores the myriad reasons that support extending marriage-based
parentage establishment avenues to male same-sex couples. Finally,
Part V sets forth a comprehensive proposal for extending marriagebased avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples who

32 See ALEX FINKELSTEIN, SARAH MAC DOUGALL, ANGELA KINTOMINAS & ANYA OLSEN,
COLUMBIA LAW SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER LAW CLINIC, SURROGACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE
U.S.: A NATIONAL CONVERSATION INFORMED BY GLOBAL LAWMAKING 8 (2016),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/files/columbia_
sexuality_and_gender_law_clinic_-_surrogacy_law_and_policy_report_-_june_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KSA-UPTF].
33 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2342.
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conceive children via gestational surrogacy using sperm from one
member of the couple and donor ova.
I.

CURRENT NON-ADOPTIVE MARRIAGE-BASED AVENUES OF
ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE

When one member of a married different-sex couple conceives or
gives birth to a child during the marriage, the legal parentage of their
spouse generally is established through a non-adoptive marriage-based
avenue. Due to the fact that same-sex couples could not legally marry
for most of the nation’s history, the marriage-based avenues used to
establish parentage for the spouse of the individual who gave birth were,
for a long time, simply unavailable to same-sex couples. In 2004,
however, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex
marriage.34 Between 2004 and 2015, the legalization of same-sex
marriage expanded rapidly throughout the United States, culminating
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck
down the remaining state bans on same-sex marriage.35 Obergefell set
forth the important proposition that states may not “bar same-sex
couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the
opposite sex.”36 As a result, same-sex spouses of individuals who give
birth now have significantly greater access to the non-adoptive
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage enjoyed by their
different-sex counterparts.
A. Establishing the Spouse’s Legal Parentage Through the Marital
Presumption of Parentage
The marital presumption of parentage, under which a husband was
presumed to be the legal father of any child born to or conceived by his
wife during the marriage, arose from English common law.37 In the
United States, the marital presumption has served as a core component
of the law governing parentage since the nation’s inception.38 Early
justifications for the marital presumption included that it protected
children from being deemed illegitimate, a status which deprived
34 Looking Back at the Legalization of Gay Marriage in Mass., BOS. GLOBE (June 26, 2015,
12:26 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/26/looking-back-legalization-gaymarriage-mass/uhCeyrSeJtWty9tSUde1PI/story.html [https://perma.cc/3H29-MB9G].
35 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
36 Id. at 680.
37 Glennon, supra note 10, at 562.
38 Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the Marital Presumption for the Modern
Era, 104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 243 (2019) [hereinafter Restructuring Rebuttal].
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children of significant legal rights and protections and carried a
profound stigma;39 avoided “evidentiary impasses”40 and provided
parentage to the man viewed as most likely to be the child’s biological
father during a time when scientific advancements did not yet allow for
the definitive determination of biological paternity;41 promoted
parenthood within marriage;42 protected the harmony and integrity of
the marital family unit;43 and reduced government spending by
ensuring that more children had two legal parents obligated to support
them from the time of birth.44 Although a number of the early
justifications for applying the marital presumption no longer carry the
same weight (the Supreme Court has struck down laws providing for
the unequal treatment of non-marital children in a number of important
areas45 and technology now allows for the efficient determination of
biological parentage46), there are a number of remaining justifications
for the continued application of the marital presumption.
Common justifications set forth for the continued use of the marital
presumption relate to promoting children’s best interests and protecting
39 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (“The primary policy rationale
underlying the common law’s severe restrictions on rebuttal of the presumption appears
to have been an aversion to declaring children illegitimate, thereby depriving them of
rights of inheritance and succession, and likely making them wards of the state.”
(citations omitted)).
40 Debi McRae, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Best Interests Marital Presumption
of Paternity: It Is Actually in the Best Interests of Children to Divorce the Current
Application of the Best Interests Marital Presumption of Paternity, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 345, 349-50 (2006).
41 Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L.
REV. 465, 478 (2016) (“And, in the majority of instances, a mother’s husband is, indeed,
the child’s biological father.”); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297,
317 (“[O]ne presumptive purpose [of the marital presumption] has been the
codification of empirical inference — the best available method of determining factual
biological paternity. Who is the biological father? The most likely candidate is the man
having sexual intercourse with the mother. Who is most likely having sexual
intercourse with the mother? Her husband.”).
42 See Glennon, supra note 10, at 590-91.
43 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125.
44 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 246-47 (2006).
45 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (inheritance); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973) (child support); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972) (workers’ compensation benefits); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(wrongful death claims).
46 Paternity Blood Tests and DNA, FINDLAW, https://family.findlaw.com/paternity/
paternity-tests-blood-tests-and-dna.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
H2VE-QLJC].
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marriages and marital family units. The marital presumption is a simple,
efficient method of providing a child born to a married individual with
a second legal parent from the time of birth.47 Providing children with
two legal parents — each of whom has a duty to care for and support
the child — from the earliest possible point, promotes both children’s
best interests48 and societal interests.49 Furthermore, the popular belief
that children benefit from being raised within a marital family has
persisted.50 In addition, the presumption protects the harmony and
integrity of marriages, and stable marital families are considered “a
critical social good.”51 Importantly, in the vast majority of instances
involving a child born to a married individual, the marital presumption
is never challenged.52 Thus, the marital presumption generally serves to
protect both “the integrity of the marriage” and the relationship that has
47 Mikaela Shotwell, Note, Won’t Somebody Please Think of the Children?!: Why Iowa
Must Extend the Marital Presumption to Children Born to Married, Same-Sex Couples, 15
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 141, 144 (2012) (“Because this legal status carries with it a
number of rights and duties, the marital presumption, in effect, ‘gives the child a legal
father who must provide care and support for the child.’” (quoting Kathy T. Graham,
Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents, and Their Children’s Rights as Children, 48
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1008 (2008))); see Jacobs, supra note 41, at 470 (stating that
the presumption has “ease of application”).
48 William M. Lopez, Note, Artificial Insemination and the Presumption of Parenthood:
Traditional Foundations and Modern Applications for Lesbian Mothers, 86 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 897, 903 (2011) (“[C]hildren benefit from the simple fact of having a legally
recognized relationship with both parents . . . .”); Jennifer B. Mertus, Note, In re
Adoption of R.B.F.: A Step Toward the Recognition and Acceptance of Non-Traditional
Families, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 171, 185 (2003) (“Having two legal
parents, regardless of their sexuality, provides many economic, legal, and psychological
benefits to a child.”).
49 Appleton, supra note 44, at 246 (“A less altruistic version of the child-welfare
rationale for the presumption of legitimacy shifts the focus to the public or society in
general. On a purely practical level, the law’s preference for the marital family long has
helped protect the public purse and the public interest in clear rules of descent.”); see
also Mark Strasser, Presuming Parentage, 25 TEX. J. WOMEN GENDER & L. 57, 60 (2015).
50 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646 (2015) (discussing “the significant
material costs of being raised by unmarried parents,” including being “relegated to a
more difficult and uncertain family life”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass.
309, 383 (2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (describing marriage as “the foremost setting
for the education and socialization of children”); Appleton, supra note 44, at 243
(“According to one popular understanding today, the presumption of legitimacy has
served and should continue to serve a child-welfare objective.”); Glennon, supra note
42, at 590-91 (“Courts often justify privileging the marital relationship on the ground
that parenthood within marriage best protects children.”).
51 Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 39 n.25
(2006).
52 Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell’s Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 92 CHI.KENT L. REV. 55, 67 (2017).
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formed between the spouse of the individual who gave birth and the
child.53 Today, every state continues to apply the marital presumption
in some form,54 and it remains the most common way of establishing an
individual other than the person who gave birth as a child’s legal
parent.55
With regard to the application of the marital presumption of
parentage to same-sex spouses of individuals who give birth, while
Obergefell did not explicitly discuss the extension of the marital
presumption to same-sex couples, it held that states must provide
marriage to same-sex couples on the “same terms” accorded to
different-sex couples.56 As a result, states’ marital presumptions of
parentage should apply equally to same- and different-sex spouses of
individuals who give birth.57 The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in
Pavan v. Smith provides strong additional support for the argument that
Obergefell requires the extension of the marital presumption of
parentage to same-sex spouses of individuals who give birth.58 In Pavan,
the Court, applying Obergefell, held that because Arkansas law generally
requires the name of the different-sex spouse of an individual who gave
birth to appear on a child’s birth certificate, the state could not refuse
to list the name of the same-sex spouse of an individual who gave birth
on the child’s birth certificate.59
Most courts that have addressed the issue of whether a state’s marital
presumption of parentage extends to the same-sex spouse of an
individual who gives birth have answered the question in the
affirmative.60 Moreover, several jurisdictions have amended their
53

Id.
Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody
and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 622-23 (2009).
55 Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647,
1659 (2015).
56 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646 (2015). With its extension to female
same-sex couples, it makes more sense to refer to the presumption as the “marital
presumption of parentage” as opposed to the “marital presumption of paternity.”
57 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 5:22 (“After Obergefell v. Hodges, all marriagebased parentage rules — including the marital presumption — should be applied
equally to same-sex spouses . . . .”).
58 Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017).
59 Id. However, Pavan concerned only birth certificates, not the presumption of
parentage itself, and generally “a birth certificate is merely prima facie evidence of the
information stated within.” JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 5:25.
60 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 496-98 (Ariz. 2017)
(holding that the marital presumption extends to the same-sex spouse of an individual
who gives birth); Barse v. Pasternak, 2015 WL 600973, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2015)
(same); Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 340-41 (Iowa 2013)
54
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marital presumption statutes to clarify that the presumption applies to
the spouse of an individual who gives birth regardless of the spouse’s
sex.61 In addition, a number of states’ parentage laws indicate that,
insofar as is practicable, provisions addressing the determination of
paternity should apply to determinations of maternity.62 It seems
(same); Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (same);
Christopher YY v. Jessica ZZ, 159 A.D.3d 18, 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (same); In re
Joseph O. v. Danielle B., 158 A.D.3d 767, 769-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (same); see also
Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 709
(2014) (“Most states that recognize same-sex marriages, for example, also extend the
marital presumption of paternity to gay and lesbian couples . . . .”); cf. Chaisson v. State,
239 So. 3d 1074, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 2018) (“The Registrar maintains the presumption
of parentage for the non-child bearing spouse provided for [under Louisiana law] is not
biologically based but is based on the marriage contract in existence at the time of [the
child’s] birth. Thus, the Registrar is legally required to provide equal protection to same
sex couples seeking to amend a birth certificate, under Obergefell . . . .”); Miller-Jenkins
v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 968-70 (Vt. 2004) (ruling that because civil unions
granted same-sex couples all of the rights and obligations of marriage, the marital
presumption of parentage applied to same-sex couples who had entered into civil
unions). However, not all courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 128 A.D.3d 968, 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (holding that
the statutory marital presumptions of paternity did not apply to the wife of woman who
conceived a child during the marriage, “since the presumption of legitimacy [the
statutes] create is one of a biological relationship, not of legal status . . . and, as the nongestational spouse in a same-sex marriage, there is no possibility that [the wife] is the
child’s biological parent”) (citations omitted); Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 474 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 2014) (declining to apply the marital presumption of paternity to a same-sex
couple and explaining that the state’s “Marriage Equality Act does not require the court
to ignore the obvious biological differences between husbands and wives”); In re A.E.,
2017 WL 1535101, at *8 (Tex. App. 2017) (declining to apply the marital presumption
to a same-sex couple and stating that “Obergefell did not hold that every state law related
to the marital relationship or the parent-child relationship must be ‘gender neutral’”).
61 NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2339.
62 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-122 (2020) (“Any interested party may
bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child
relationship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this article applicable to the father
and child relationship apply.”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.106 (2020) (“The
provisions of this chapter relating to the determination of paternity apply to a
determination of maternity.”); see also JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:19 (“Courts in a
growing number of states — including Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
and Virginia — have held that [paternity] provisions must be applied in a genderneutral manner.”); NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2294 (“In many states, such application
has been aided by explicit gender-neutrality directives modeled on the UPA. The
original UPA provides that in actions ‘to determine the existence or nonexistence of a
mother and child relationship[,] [i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions . . . applicable
to the father and child relationship apply.’ The revised UPA includes a similar directive,
stating that the provisions ‘relating to determination of paternity apply to
determinations of maternity.’”).
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probable that in the coming years, as more parentage disputes arise
involving children born to same-sex spouses, more states will explicitly
extend the marital presumption of parentage to encompass same-sex
spouses of individuals who give birth. Furthermore, assuming that
Obergefell and Pavan are not overturned, it is likely that all states that
wish to maintain the marital presumption will need to extend it to samesex spouses of individuals who give birth.63
It is important to note that while the extension of existing state
marital presumption of parentage standards to same-sex spouses is an
important step that will be effective in providing parentage to same-sex
spouses in situations in which the presumption is never challenged, the
grounds for rebuttal, which have always centered on proving a lack of
genetic connection between the spouse of the individual who gave birth
and the child, will need to be restructured in order for the presumption
to fully and meaningfully encompass same-sex couples.64 Since in most
cases involving same-sex couples the spouse of the individual who gave
birth will not be genetically connected to the child, to create a marital
presumption that fairly, logically, and effectively encompasses same-sex
couples, states must engage in the important undertaking of
restructuring their current standards so that a spouse’s lack of genetic
connection to the child, by itself, is no longer the basis for rebuttal (at
least in cases of nonsexual conception).65 There are a number of other
ways to structure rebuttal of the marital presumption, such as requiring,
in addition to proof of a lack of genetic connection between the spouse
and child, proof of a lack of mutual intent between the parties for the
spouse to be the child’s legal parent or proof of a lack of parental
function on the part of the spouse.66 Overall, while there is still work to
be done with regard to the grounds for rebuttal, the extension of the
marital presumption of parentage to same-sex spouses of individuals
who give birth is a critically important development that will provide
significantly more same-sex couples with a simple and inexpensive
method of establishing parentage.

63

Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 38, at 257.
See generally id. (arguing that restructuring the marital presumption of parentage
so that a spouse’s lack of genetic connection to the child is no longer the basis for
rebuttal is essential to establishing a marital presumption that effectively encompasses
same-sex couples).
65 Id. at 246.
66 Id. at 271.
64
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B. Establishing the Spouse’s Legal Parentage Through Consent to
Assisted Reproduction Laws
Another common marriage-based avenue to establishing parentage
stems from state laws that provide parentage to an individual based
upon that individual having provided their consent to their spouse’s use
of assisted reproduction to conceive a child. Under existing statutory or
common law rules throughout the United States, a husband who
consents to his wife’s use of assisted reproduction with the intent to be
the resulting child’s parent is deemed a legal parent regardless of
whether the child is conceived using the husband’s sperm or donor
sperm.67 In some jurisdictions, the laws providing parentage based upon
a husband’s consent to his wife’s use of assisted reproduction require
that the husband’s consent be in writing, that the procedure be
performed by or under the supervision of a physician, or both.68 In at
least one state, the spousal consent to assisted reproduction law’s
application is restricted to situations involving only certain types of
assisted reproduction procedures.69
Under Obergefell and Pavan, spousal consent to assisted reproduction
laws should extend to a same-sex spouse who, with the intent to be the
resulting child’s parent, consents to their spouse’s use of assisted
reproduction to conceive a child.70 Most courts that have addressed the
issue have ruled that assisted reproduction statutes that on their face
provide parentage only to husbands who consent to their wives’ use of
assisted reproduction to conceive a child also apply to wives who
consent to their wives’ use of assisted reproduction to conceive a child.71

67

JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:3.
Id.
69 See Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253, 256 (2017) (holding that the state’s
assisted reproduction statute, which “creates an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy
with respect to all children born within wedlock or within the usual period of gestation
thereafter who were conceived by means of artificial insemination” when both spouses
consented to the procedure in writing, did not apply in situations in which the child
had been conceived via in vitro fertilization (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
70 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:3 (“After the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges
requiring that states permit and recognize marriages between same-sex spouses on the
‘same terms and conditions’ as for different-sex spouses, these rules . . . must be applied
equally to same-sex couples who have children through assisted reproduction during
their marriage.”).
71 Id. § 3:4 (“A number of courts have held that gendered assisted reproduction
provisions must be applied equally to a female intended parent . . . There are a small
number of courts, however, that have resisted these trends and directions.”); NeJaime,
supra note 18, at 2294 (“[C]ourts that have considered the issue in other states have,
almost without exception, applied these statutes to married same-sex couples.”).
68
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In addition, a growing number of states are adopting spousal consent to
assisted reproduction statutes that contain gender-neutral terms in
reference to the class of individuals who may use this avenue to
establish their legal parentage.72 Furthermore, as noted above, a number
of states’ parentage laws indicate that provisions that apply to paternity
determinations should be interpreted, insofar as is practicable, to apply
to maternity determinations.73 Importantly, especially for same-sex
couples, while in most states the marital presumption of parentage
provides the spouse of the individual who gives birth with only a
rebuttable presumption of parentage, the parentage for the spouse
established by consent to assisted reproduction laws generally is
conclusive and irrefutable.74 However, even for married couples who
conceive through assisted reproduction, the existence of both types of
marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage (the marital
presumption of parentage and spousal consent to assisted reproduction
laws) is essential, as the marital presumption serves as an important
safety net in situations where the formal requirements of spousal
consent to assisted reproduction laws have not been satisfied.75
C. The Limited Reach of Existing Non-Adoptive Marriage-Based
Avenues of Establishing Parentage
The extension to same-sex couples of non-adoptive marriage-based
avenues to establishing parentage represents a critical step in the right
direction towards providing equitable treatment for same-sex parents
and their children. Unfortunately, however, thus far the extension of
non-adoptive marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage
generally has reached only one subset of married same-sex couples:
those in which one member of the marital unit has carried and given
birth to the child in question.76 This is because the existing
“[p]resumptions of parentage for the second parent, even when they
72

See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:4; NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2294 n.163.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:4 (“[I]f an assisted reproduction statute applies,
it often is the most direct and strongest claim since it typically provides for a conclusive,
nonrebuttable basis for establishing parentage.”).
75 See Wendy G–M. v. Erin G–M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 853-55 (Sup. Ct. 2014)
(holding that although the parties had not complied with the formal requirements of
the spousal consent to assisted reproduction statute, the marital presumption provided
a separate means for establishing the spouse’s parentage).
76 NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2312. But see In re Maria-Irene D., 153 A.D.3d 1203,
1205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (applying the marital presumption of parentage to the
biological father’s same-sex spouse).
73
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apply to both women and men, relate to that person’s marriage to ‘the
woman giving birth.’”77 For married cisgender male same-sex couples,
however, neither member of the couple is able to give birth to the child;
instead, the couple must utilize a surrogate in order to have a child who
is genetically related to one member of the couple.78 Thus, because the
existing non-adoptive marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage
stem from marriage to the individual who gave birth to the child, as
opposed to marriage to the child’s biological parent, married male samesex couples are excluded from these simple, efficient avenues of
establishing parentage.79 Instead, married male same-sex couples who
utilize surrogacy to conceive a child who is genetically related to one
member of the couple must pursue other avenues to establish both
members of the couple as the child’s legal parents.
II. CURRENT METHODS OF ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE FOR MARRIED
MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES WHO UTILIZE GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
When a married cisgender male same-sex couple utilizes surrogacy,
only one member of the couple, at most, will share a genetic connection
to the child. Consequently, there necessarily will be one member of the
couple who is a non-biological intended parent and thus cannot
establish his parentage through the existing avenues that allow men to
establish parentage on the basis of actual or perceived biological
connections to a child.80 The non-biological intended parent also
generally cannot establish his parentage through existing non-adoptive
marriage-based avenues.81 As detailed above, the current marriagebased methods of establishing parentage stem from an individual’s
marriage to the person who gave birth to the child as opposed to an
individual’s marriage to the child’s biological parent.82 As a result, while
77

NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2312.
Jenna Casolo, Campbell Curry-Ledbetter, Meagan Edmonds, Gabrielle Field,
Kathleen O’Neill & Marisa Poncia, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 20 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 313, 344 (2019) (“Because LGBT men cannot reproduce on their own, they must
have the cooperation and support of a woman to act as their surrogate.”).
79 Libby Adler, Inconceivable: Status, Contract, and the Search for a Legal Basis for
Gay & Lesbian Parenthood, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 17 (2018) (“Indeed, the most recent
version of the Uniform Parentage Act . . . maintains automatic parenting rights for a
birth mother and then presumes parentage for the birth mother’s spouse, but the spouse
of a male biological parent acquires no such presumption.”); NeJaime, supra note 18, at
2314 (“Ordinary parentage rules simply do not permit dual parentage for male samesex couples absent adoption.”).
80 NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2312.
81 See supra Part II.
82 See supra Part II.
78
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a number of non-adoptive avenues of establishing parentage may be
available to the biological intended parent, surrogacy law generally
represents the only potential non-adoptive avenue through which the
non-biological intended parent can establish parentage.
Surrogacy typically involves an agreement between the surrogate and
intended parent(s) providing that the surrogate agrees to become
pregnant through the use of assisted reproduction and to relinquish
parental rights to any resulting child to the intended parent(s).83 In the
context of gestational surrogacy, which is estimated to represent
approximately 95% of all surrogacy arrangements today,84 the surrogate
is not genetically connected to the child.85 Instead, ova and sperm from
the intended parent(s) or gamete donor(s) are used to create the embryo
that will be implanted in the surrogate.86 It has become increasingly
common for both male same-sex couples and different-sex couples
wherein medical issues make it risky or impossible for the wife to carry
a child to pursue gestational surrogacy arrangements.87 According to a
report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, between
2005 and 2014, the number of embryo transfers that involved
gestational surrogates almost doubled.88
In the United States, surrogacy is a complex area of the law and legal
regulation of gestational surrogacy varies dramatically by jurisdiction.
Slightly under half of states have statutes that explicitly address
gestational surrogacy, some states have only case law addressing
gestational surrogacy, and still other states have no statutory or case law
governing gestational surrogacy.89 A few states consider surrogacy

83

Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 330.
Hinson & McBrien, supra note 15, at 33.
85 See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2014 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 52 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2014report/art-2014-national-summary-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6VB-X9FL].
In
contrast, “[a] traditional surrogate supplies both the egg, or genetic component, and the
gestational role of carrying the pregnancy to term.” Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 316.
86 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:1; ROBERT JOHN KANE & LAWRENCE E. SINGER, THE
LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS § 35:9 (2019).
87 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:1 n.1; Paige Lyons, Are You My Mother?: Equality
for Same-Sex Parents in Texas Following Obergefell, 51 TEX. TECH L. REV. 241, 250 (2019);
Nara Schoenberg, Gay Men Increasingly Turn to Surrogates to Have Babies, CHICAGO TRIB.
(Nov. 23, 2016, 8:59 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/sc-gay-menhaving-babies-health-1130-20161123-story.html [https://perma.cc/PV5K-YZXB].
88 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 85, at 52.
89 FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 8; see JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:12;
NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2376 app. E.
84
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contracts void and unenforceable.90 In the jurisdictions that have
statutes or appellate case law recognizing the enforceability of at least
some categories of gestational surrogacy agreements, there are different
approaches relating to issues such as, inter alia, the procedure for
entering into the agreement, who is eligible to serve as a surrogate,
whether and to what extent the surrogate can be compensated, and the
types of substantive provisions that may be included in the agreement.91
For example, in many states the parties to the surrogacy contract must
be represented by independent legal counsel, and the surrogate, the
intended parents, or both, must undergo psychological and medical
evaluations.92 A couple of states require either a home study of the
intended parents, judicial preauthorization of the surrogacy agreement
(meaning a court must approve the agreement before the surrogate
becomes pregnant), or both.93 A number of states mandate that to be
eligible to serve as a surrogate, the individual must have had at least one
prior pregnancy that was carried to term.94 In some states only
uncompensated surrogacy is permitted, while other states permit
compensated surrogacy.95
Importantly, the jurisdictions with statutes or appellate case law
governing gestational surrogacy also differ with regard to the categories
of intended parents who are eligible to enter into enforceable surrogacy
agreements.96 In states that recognize the enforceability of at least some
gestational surrogacy agreements, the approaches to the categories of
90 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2020) (stating that no person may enter
into a surrogacy agreement); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2020) (stating that it is against
public policy to enforce surrogacy agreements); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2020)
(stating that surrogacy agreements are void and unenforceable); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1418-05 (2020) (stating that surrogacy agreements are void). New York recently passed
legislation lifting its long-time ban on gestational surrogacy. Elizabeth Chuck, New York
State, Long a Holdout Against Legalizing Surrogacy, Overturns Ban, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3,
2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-york-state-long-holdout-againstlegalizing-surrogacy-overturns-ban-n1176071 [https://perma.cc/DJ3G-Z2FQ]. The
new law takes effect on February 15, 2021. Id.
91 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:2; Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 330-37.
92 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:2; Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 335.
93 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2720(B) (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2020); Casolo et al.,
supra note 78, at 334-335 n.202.
94 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:2.
95 Id. With regard to the substance of the agreement, a few states expressly limit the
ability of surrogacy contracts to restrict the surrogate’s right to make medical decisions
during the course of the pregnancy, while a few other states expressly permit the
inclusion of provisions restricting the surrogate’s rights to engage in activities that may
harm the fetus. Id.
96 See id.; Casolo et al., supra note 78, at 330-37.
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individuals who may enter into enforceable surrogacy agreements as
intended parents range from permissive jurisdictions that place no
marriage- or gender-based restrictions on intended parents to restrictive
jurisdictions in which eligibility is limited to very narrow categories of
intended parents.97 In terms of the specific types of eligibility
restrictions for intended parents, the language of a number of state
surrogacy statutes restricts eligibility to married intended parents.98 In
addition, a few jurisdictions restrict eligibility by requiring that gametes
from at least one of the intended parents be used to conceive the child.99
Louisiana and North Dakota go even further, requiring that gametes
from both of the intended parents be used to conceive the child —
thereby excluding cisgender male same-sex couples from eligibility.100
Moreover, male same-sex couples also seemingly are excluded from
entering into enforceable surrogacy agreements in the three
jurisdictions that require proof that the intended mother (who generally
would not exist in the context of male same-sex couples) is unable to
carry a pregnancy altogether or without serious risk to her health or the
health of the fetus.101 The language of the Arkansas statute governing
97 The United States Surrogacy Law Map, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS (2016),
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/ (last visited Nov.
11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C2ZB-H5D7] (describing the laws governing surrogacy
agreements in every state).
98 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:2 (identifying the states as Florida, Louisiana,
Texas, Utah, and Virginia).
99 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.15-16 (2020) (stating that if neither of the
intended parents is a genetic parent, the surrogate “assume[s] parental rights and
responsibilities for the child.”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 47/20 (2020) (requiring that at
least one of the gametes used to conceive the child come from an intended parent);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (2020) (noting that a gestational surrogacy agreement
is not authorized if neither intended parent provided the gametes used to conceive the
child).
100 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718.1(6) (2020) (providing that “[i]ntended parents” means
“a married couple who each exclusively contribute their own gametes to create their
embryo . . . .”); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01, -05, -08 (2020) (recognizing intended
parents as legal parents only when the person carrying the child meets the definition of
a “gestational carrier,” defining the term gestational carrier to require that the embryo
implanted in the individual be conceived from the ova and sperm of the intended
parents, and identifying the woman carrying the child and her husband (if he was a
party to the agreement as the child’s legal parents in all other surrogacy situations)).
101 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2720.3 (2020); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 160.756 (2020). The constitutionality of such provisions is questionable.
In 2019, the Utah Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Obergefell, the provision of the
surrogacy statute requiring that there be an intended mother who is unable to bear a
child altogether or without unreasonable risk to the mother or child unconstitutionally
infringed on the rights of married male same-sex couples. In re Gestational Agreement,
449 P.3d 69, 80 (Utah 2019).
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gestational surrogacy also excludes married male same-sex couples,
albeit through a different mechanism, by declaring that when the
biological father’s sperm is used to conceive the child, the child’s other
parent is “the woman intended to be the mother if the biological father
is married.”102 Due to the various eligibility restrictions within existing
state surrogacy laws and the lack of surrogacy laws in many states,
surrogacy laws provide a non-adoptive avenue to establishing parentage
for male same-sex couples in only a minority of jurisdictions.
A. Non-Adoptive Legal Recognition of Both the Biological Intended
Parent and the Non-Biological Intended Parent
When a different-sex married couple enters into a valid gestational
surrogacy agreement in which a child is conceived using sperm from
one member of the couple and ova from a gamete donor, approximately
eighteen jurisdictions have statutory or appellate case law governing
surrogacy that explicitly recognizes both spouses as the child’s legal
parents.103 It is important to note that the statutory language in a few of

Whether the language of the medically-related requirements of a number of other
states’ statutes excludes male same-sex couples is unclear. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 47/20 (2020) (requiring the intended parent or parents to prove that “he, she, or they
have a medical need for the gestational surrogacy as evidenced by a qualified physician’s
affidavit attached to the gestational surrogacy”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2020)
(requiring a finding that “[t]he intended parent is infertile, is unable to bear a child, or
is unable to do so without unreasonable risk to the unborn child or to the physical or
mental health of the intended parent or the child”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 557.10 (2020)
(requiring that the court find that “[t]he medical evidence provided shows that the
intended parent is unable to carry a pregnancy to term and give birth to a child or is
unable to carry a pregnancy to term and give birth to a child without unreasonable risk
to the intended parent’s physical or mental health or to the health of the unborn child”).
102 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2020).
103 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2020); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7606, 7960, 7962
(2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-36, -48a (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-805, -806,
-807 (2020); D.C. CODE §§ 16-403, -407 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2020); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. §§ 47/20, /25 (2020); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1933 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. §
126.750 (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1, :7 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1762, -67 (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 557.5, 557.6 (2020); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
160.754 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 803
(2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.740 (2020); In re
S.S, 128 A.3d 296, 306-07 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). In addition, Rhode Island and New
York will join this category of states beginning on January 1, 2021 and February 15,
2021, respectively. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 581-406 (2020) (effective Feb. 15, 2021);
Associated Press, Gov Signs Bill Ensuring Parental Rights for Same Sex Couples,
7NEWSBOSTON (July 21, 2020), https://whdh.com/news/gov-signs-bill-ensuringparental-rights-for-same-sex-couples/ [https://perma.cc/3CPX-J9YZ]. One of the Ohio
intermediate appellate courts (there are twelve, each of which covers a different
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these states is written in gendered terms that, if applied as written,
would exclude male same-sex couples.104 As a result, only
approximately fifteen of the jurisdictions that provide parentage to both
spouses when a child is conceived using sperm from one of the spouses
and ova from a donor have laws that do not contain gendered language
excluding male same-sex couples.105 In these fifteen jurisdictions, both
members of a married male same-sex couple, the biological intended
father and the non-biological intended father, can establish legal
parentage pursuant to the state’s surrogacy law — neither member of
the couple has to pursue adoption procedures to establish parentage.
In a number of the jurisdictions with gestational surrogacy laws that
recognize both intended parents as the child’s legal parents when a child
is conceived using sperm from one member of the couple and ova from
a gamete donor, courts can grant pre-birth parentage orders that
identify the intended parents as the child’s legal parents before the child
is born.106 Pre-birth orders are an important tool for intended parents.
Notably, “[o]btaining a judgment prior to the birth of the child removes
any uncertainty about the respective rights and obligations of the
parties.”107 As the child’s legal parents, the intended parents generally
will have immediate access to and custody of the child and control over
decisions relating to the child’s post-birth care, and the hospital will be

geographical location) held that the gestational surrogacy agreement between an
unmarried non-biological intended mother and surrogate for the conception of a child
using donor ova and donor sperm was enforceable and established the intended
mother’s legal parentage. See S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 471-72 (Ohio Ct. App.
2010). In cases before Ohio courts that are bound by or otherwise follow this decision,
the non-biological intended mother of a child conceived using donor ova and sperm
from the intended mother’s husband also likely would be deemed a legal parent. In
addition, there are reports of trial courts in other jurisdictions providing parentage
judgments that recognize both spouses as the child’s legal parents in this situation
despite the lack of any statutory or appellate authority explicitly providing for such
judgments in the jurisdiction. See Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A
Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal
Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1245-49 (2014).
104 These states include Arkansas, Florida, and Texas. See supra notes 101–02 and
accompanying text.
105 See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
106 There are approximately ten states in which “[s]urrogacy is permitted for all
parents, pre-birth orders are granted throughout the state, and both parents will be
named on the birth certificate.” The United States Surrogacy Law Map, supra note 97.
New York will join this category of states beginning on February 15, 2021. See S.
Assemb. 7506, 2019–2020 Legis. Sess., N.Y. FAM. CT. § 581-203 (2019).
107 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:20.
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able to discharge the child to the intended parents.108 Pre-birth orders
also often allow the intended parents to be listed as the child’s legal
parents on the original birth certificate.109
In a few of the jurisdictions that recognize both of the intended
parents as legal parents when a child is conceived using sperm from one
member of the couple and donor ova, the intended parents must wait
until the child is born to obtain an order establishing their legal
parentage.110 A post-birth order may be required in addition to or
instead of pre-birth judicial approval of the surrogacy agreement.111 On
the other end of the spectrum, a few states’ gestational surrogacy
statutes establish legal parentage for intended parents who enter into a
valid surrogacy agreement without any requirement of judicial
involvement.112 Even in these jurisdictions, however, experts
recommend that the intended parents nonetheless obtain a court order
reflecting their legal parentage.113 This is because “a judgment will
provide greater assurance that the parties’ legal parentage will be
recognized by other states and by the federal government,” as even
courts in jurisdictions that do not recognize surrogacy agreements have
held that orders from other states establishing parentage in the
surrogacy context must be given full faith and credit.114

108 Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders in
Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 634-35 (2005); Nick Stanley, Comment,
Freedom of Family: The Right to Enforceable Family Contracts, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAW. 223, 229 (2018).
109 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 108, at 634-35; Stanley, supra note 108, at 229.
110 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 4:8, :20 (“In a small number of states that permit
surrogacy by statute, the legal parentage of the intended parents must be ‘confirmed’ by
a court after the birth of the child.”).
111 Id. § 4:8; Elizabeth J. Samuels, An Immodest Proposal for Birth Registration in
Donor-Assisted Reproduction in the Interest of Science and Human Rights, 48 N.M. L. REV.
416, 429 (2018).
112 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 47/15 (2020) (stating that when the parties
have entered into a valid gestational surrogacy agreement, the intended parents are the
parents of the child for purposes of state law immediately upon the birth of the child);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1933 (2020) (providing that when the parties have
entered into a valid gestational surrogacy agreement, the intended parent(s) are by
operation of law the parent(s) of the resulting child immediately upon the birth of the
child); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“[O]n birth of a child
conceived by assisted reproduction under a gestational surrogacy agreement, each
intended parent is, by operation of law, a parent of the child.”).
113 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:17.
114 Id.
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B. Non-Adoptive Legal Recognition of Only the Biological Intended
Parent
As discussed above, only a minority of states have laws governing
surrogacy that recognize the parentage of both members of a married
couple (different- or same-sex) who conceive a child via gestational
surrogacy using sperm from the biological intended father and donor
ova.115 In most states that lack such laws, only one of the spouses — the
biological intended father — can establish parentage through nonadoptive avenues.116 Specifically, the biological intended father often is
able to establish parentage through existing procedures for establishing
paternity that long have been utilized outside of the surrogacy
context.117 This generally will involve either judicial procedures that
allow a man to establish paternity based upon proof of a genetic tie to
the child or voluntary acknowledgement of paternity procedures that
allow a man to establish paternity by jointly executing a document with
the birth mother (and, if applicable, her spouse) acknowledging the
man’s paternity.118
115

See supra Part II.A.
See infra note 118 and accompanying text. In some jurisdictions, case law or
legislative directive makes clear that the non-biological intended parent will need to
pursue adoption in order to obtain legal parentage. NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2309
n.239. “In the remaining states without statutory guidance or negative case law,
adoption would presumably be required because of the operation of the governing
parentage rules.” Id.
117 See infra note 118.
118 See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. § 641-99.15(144) (2020) (stating that “[i]f the
surrogate birth mother is unmarried and the intended father is the sperm donor, the
unmarried surrogate birth mother and the intended father may complete a Voluntary
Paternity Affidavit form after the child’s birth . . . .”); In re Paternity and Maternity of
Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that although state law
did not recognize the surrogacy agreement, the biological father could establish his
paternity through existing procedures that allow for the establishment of a man’s
paternity when there is a joint stipulation that the man is the child’s biological father
executed by the surrogate, her husband, and the man); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250, at *12 (Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009)
(holding that although at the time state law did not recognize the surrogacy agreement
(New Jersey has since enacted legislation recognizing gestational surrogacy
agreements), the biological father was a legally recognized parent pursuant to the
existing state laws governing the establishment of paternity); Arredondo v. Nodelman,
622 N.Y.S.2d 181, 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (explaining that the biological father was
able to establish his paternity through a filiation proceeding in which he submitted DNA
evidence indicating that he was the child’s genetic father); In re Adoption of J., 72
N.Y.S.3d 811, 812 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018) (holding that although surrogacy agreements
were void and unenforceable in New York, in order to establish his legal parentage the
biological intended father nonetheless “could have asked the surrogate to place his
name on [the child’s] birth certificate, signed an acknowledgment of paternity,
116
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Adoption, however, is the only avenue through which the other
spouse, the non-biological intended parent, can establish parentage in
these jurisdictions. This is because even when the biological intended
father is able to establish parentage through existing paternity
establishment procedures, the law presumes that the individual who
gave birth to the child is the child’s other legal parent.119 When donor
ova are used to conceive the child, which is what occurs in the typical
gestational surrogacy situation involving a male same-sex couple, the
presumption of legal parentage attaching to the surrogate based upon
the act of giving birth generally is conclusive and irrefutable, regardless
of her wishes.120 In most instances, terminating the surrogate’s legal
parentage will require an adoption procedure in which the surrogate
agrees to the voluntary termination of her parental rights and the nonbiological intended parent adopts the child.121
Even if the surrogate is not recognized as a legal parent because, for
example, the jurisdiction (unlike most) allows for rebuttal of the
presumed parentage of an individual who gives birth to a child
conceived using donor ova on genetics-based grounds,122 the nonbiological intended parent within a married male same-sex couple still
registered with the putative father registry, submitted to a deoxyribonucleic acid test,
or filed a paternity petition”); cf. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (2020) (“A surrogate
parenthood contract entered into shall be void and unenforceable. The biological father
of a child born pursuant to such a contract shall have all the rights and obligations
imposed by law with respect to such child.”); J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1293
(D. Utah 2002) (stating that although Utah did not enforce surrogacy agreements at the
time (the law has since changed), the biological intended parents must not be precluded
from establishing parentage through genetics-based avenues); In re Declaration of
Parentage and Termination of Parental Rights of Doe, 372 P.3d 1106, 1107 (Idaho 2016)
(noting that the “Intended Father, Gestational Carrier and Husband, each signed an
affidavit stating that Intended Father, and not Husband, is the biological father of child
and should be listed on the birth certificate”).
119 See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 127 (2006)
(explaining that the law generally bestows parentage to individuals who give birth as “a
matter of course”).
120 See infra note 137 and accompanying text; see also NeJaime, supra note 18, at
2311.
121 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2313 (“Yet, for the nonbiological gay father, the
surrogate’s gestation — increasingly immaterial where the intended mother is the
genetic mother — produces legal motherhood and justifies the denial of his parental
status. Like nonbiological intended mothers in different-sex couples, nonbiological
intended fathers in same-sex couples cannot claim parentage by virtue of a relationship
to the biological father. They must, if possible, adopt the child.”).
122 See, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007) (holding that the surrogate
could disestablish her maternity on the basis of her lack of genetic connection to the
child).
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is left with adoption as the only avenue to establishing legal parentage.
This is because the surrogacy laws in these jurisdictions do not
recognize him as a legal parent, the existing paternity establishment
avenues utilized by his husband, the child’s biological father, are
unavailable to him as the non-biological intended parent, and marriagebased parentage establishment avenues stem only from marriage to the
individual who gave birth.123 Notably, in these jurisdictions, the same
result occurs for married different-sex couples who conceive children
via gestational surrogacy using sperm from the biological intended
father and donor ova — the non-biological intended mother cannot
establish parentage through surrogacy-, genetics-, or marriage-based
avenues, leaving adoption as the only option.
C. Adoptive Legal Recognition of Both Intended Parents
In a few states, both members of a married male same-sex couple may
have to pursue adoption in order to establish themselves as the legal
parents of a child born through gestational surrogacy using sperm from
one member of the couple and donor ova. For example, the law
governing surrogacy in North Dakota provides that unless the embryo
was conceived using the ova and sperm of the intended parents, “the
surrogate is the mother of a resulting child and the surrogate’s husband,
if a party to the agreement, is the father of the child.”124 Similarly, in
other states in which the provision of legal parentage based upon the
act of giving birth is conclusive and irrefutable, if the surrogate is
married and the state’s marital presumption of parentage applies to her
spouse, both intended parents may have to pursue adoption to establish
123 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2314 (“Ultimately, male same-sex couples are
excluded by a parentage regime that grounds parenthood in biological connection
outside marriage and derives nonbiological parenthood inside marriage only from
marriage to a biological mother.”); supra Part I.C.
124 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2020). North Dakota distinguishes between
“gestational carriers” and “surrogates.” Id. § 14-18-01. North Dakota defines a
gestational carrier as “an adult woman who enters into an agreement to have an embryo
implanted in her and bear the resulting child for intended parents, where the embryo is
conceived by using the egg and sperm of the intended parents.” Id. The requirement
that the embryo be conceived using the egg and sperm of the intended parents excludes
surrogacy agreements involving intended parents who are cisgender male same-sex
couples. North Dakota defines a surrogate as “an adult woman who enters into an
agreement to bear a child conceived through assisted conception for intended parents.”
Id. Consequently, the person carrying the child pursuant to an agreement with a male
same-sex couple would fall under the definition of surrogate, as opposed to gestational
carrier. While a child born to a gestational carrier is the child of the legal parents, a
child born to a surrogate is the child of the surrogate and her husband (if he was a party
to the agreement). Id. §§ 14-18-05, -08.
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legal parentage if the parties are unable to rebut the marital
presumption.125 In these situations, the consent of the surrogate and her
spouse to the relinquishment of their parental rights and the adoption
of the child by the intended parents generally would be required as part
of the adoption procedures.126
III. THE BARRIERS TO EXTENDING NON-ADOPTIVE MARRIAGE-BASED
PARENTAGE ESTABLISHMENT AVENUES TO MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES
Both male and female same-sex couples have long faced inequitable
treatment under the laws governing parentage, which often have served
to make the establishment of legal parentage significantly more
burdensome (if not impossible) for same-sex couples as compared to
their different-sex counterparts. This inequitable treatment likely stems
from societal homophobia and heteronormativity, as well as the
lingering perception that genetic connections are essential to
identifying who is entitled to recognition as a child’s legal parents.127
Although in recent years parentage law has made significant strides in
its treatment of female same-sex couples by extending non-adoptive
marriage-based parentage establishment avenues to the same-sex
spouses of individuals who give birth, male same-sex couples continue
to be excluded from these important avenues to establishing parentage.
The barriers that are unique to male same-sex couples in gaining access
to non-adoptive methods of establishing parentage are tied, in large
part, to both the significance that parentage law long has placed on the
125 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-218(B), (C) (2020) (“A surrogate is the legal
mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate parentage contract and is entitled to
custody of that child . . . . If the mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate contract
is married, her husband is presumed to be the legal father of the child.”); JOSLIN ET AL.,
supra note 11, § 4:20 (“[E]ven in situations in which one of the intended parents is a
genetic contributor, there may be circumstances under which that person is not
recognized as a legal parent of a child born through surrogacy . . . . [T]his may be the
result in states without statutes specifically governing the legal parentage of children
born through surrogacy.”); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital
Presumption Post-Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 663, 671 (2016) (“[S]ome states, such as
Michigan, may also recognize the birth mother’s husband as a legal parent and make it
relatively difficult to rebut the marital presumption.”). Around two-thirds of states
allow biological fathers who conceive children with a woman who is married to
someone else to bring actions seeking to rebut the marital presumption. Feinberg,
Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 38, at 252. Courts may deny rebuttal despite proof
that the putative father, and not the birth mother’s husband, is the child’s biological
father if it is determined that rebuttal would be contrary to the best interests of the child.
Id. at 252-53.
126 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 4:20.
127 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 102 n.7.
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act of giving birth and the deeply engrained, lingering societal views
regarding the roles of women and men in raising children.128
A. The Law’s Provision of Legal Parentage Based Upon the Act of Giving
Birth
The law long has provided legal parentage to individuals who give
birth “as a matter of course.”129 For most of the nation’s history, the
automatic provision of legal parentage based upon the act of giving birth
went largely unchallenged.130 This is almost certainly due in large part
to the fact that, until recent advancements in medical technology
leading to the availability of in vitro fertilization, the person who gave
birth necessarily was the child’s genetic parent.131 Today, of course, it is
no longer true that the person who gives birth to the child necessarily
shares a genetic connection with the child. As a result of the
advancements in reproductive technology that have allowed for the
disentanglement of gestation and genetics, the law has had to “to
confront issues in determining maternity for the first time in history.”132
At present, the only scenario in which a presumption of legal
parentage does not attach to the act of giving birth is when state law
recognizes a surrogacy agreement as establishing the intended parents
as the child’s sole legal parents prior to or upon the child’s birth. In the
absence of an enforceable surrogacy agreement, the law widely
continues to presume legal parentage based upon the act of giving

128 I agree with Professor Susan Appleton that it is correct to regard “as gender-based
an approach that excludes all gay male couples from the easy and beneficial default rule
and makes them instead navigate more onerous and intrusive hurdles, even if some
traditional and lesbian couples occasionally face such hurdles as well.” Appleton, supra
note 44, at 268.
129 Meyer, supra note 119, at 127.
130 See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 912 (2000) (“Because
pregnancy and birth are relatively public and undisputed, the law has rarely confronted
the question of legal motherhood at all.”).
131 See Lauren Springett, Why the Intent Test Falls Short: Examining the Ways in Which
the Legal System Devalues Gestation to Promote Nuclear Families, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 391, 396 (2019) (“The law privileged the mother-child relationship on the
assumption that birthing a child and having a genetic relationship with that child went
hand in hand.”); The History of Surrogacy, MODERN FAMILY SURROGACY CTR.,
http://www.modernfamilysurrogacy.com/page/surrogacy_history (last visited Aug. 30,
2019) [https://perma.cc/ZAJ3-672B] (explaining that the first gestational surrogacy
arrangement occurred in 1985).
132 J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L. REV.
345, 395 n.397 (2011).
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birth.133 However, judicial decisions in a number of jurisdictions have
provided for the rebuttal and disestablishment of the presumed legal
parentage that attaches to the individual who gave birth, despite the
unenforceability of the surrogacy agreement, when there is a genetic
intended mother seeking to establish maternity.134 The courts in these
cases have held that genetics-based avenues similar to those that exist
in the paternity establishment context can be utilized to establish the
intended mother’s maternity and to rebut and disestablish the
surrogate’s maternity.135 Specifically, the intended mother’s maternity
can be established and the surrogate’s maternity can be rebutted and
disestablished based upon proof that the intended mother’s ova were
used to conceive the child, i.e., proof that the intended mother is also
the genetic mother.136 However, the ability to rebut and disestablish the
maternity of the person who gave birth through genetics-based avenues
generally has been restricted to surrogacy arrangements that involve a
genetic intended mother.137
133

NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2300.
See, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002) (concluding that the
presumption that the individual who gave birth is a legal parent cannot lawfully be given
preclusive or conclusive effect in the light of evidence that the intended parents are the
child’s genetic parents); Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding a state statute, which declared the individual who gave birth to the child to be
the legal mother, unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); In re Paternity &
Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that “that the
paternity statutes provide a procedural template to challenge the putative relationship
between the [surrogate and child]”); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756
N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001) (holding that the intended parents, who were the “sole
genetic sources of the twins[,]” were the children’s lawful parents); A.H.W. v. G.H.B,
772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that the original birth certificate of a child
born to a surrogate could identify the intended parents whose genetic materials were
used to conceive the child as the child’s parents); T.V. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 929
N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (holding that the lower court “erred in finding that
it did not have the authority to issue an order of maternity to the Genetic Mother . . .
.”); Doe v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that
the intended mother was entitled to a declaration of maternity because she established
to a reasonable degree of certainty that she was the genetic mother); Arredondo v.
Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that the genetic mother,
and not the surrogate, was the legal mother of the child to whom the surrogate gave
birth).
135 See supra note 134.
136 See supra note 134.
137 See, e.g., In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013) (holding that the gestational surrogate could not disestablish maternity because
biological maternity had not been established in another woman); In re Parentage of a
Child by T.J.S. & A.L.S., 54 A.3d 263 (N.J. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that the
gestational surrogate, and not the non-biological intended mother, was the legal parent
134
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Restricting genetics-based rebuttal of the presumed parentage that
attaches based upon the act of giving birth to surrogacy arrangements
involving a genetic intended mother means that the legal parentage of
the surrogate, who has no genetic connection to the child herself, often
hinges on the source of the ova used to create the embryo. A pair of
cases from Indiana is illustrative. In In re Infant R., the Court of Appeals
of Indiana ruled on the legal parentage of a child born through
gestational surrogacy using the genetic materials of both the intended
mother and the intended father.138 Although surrogacy contracts are
unenforceable under Indiana law,139 the court held that, based upon
principles of equity, the maternity of the intended mother could be
established and the maternity of the surrogate disestablished based
upon clear and convincing evidence of the intended mother’s genetic
connection to the child.140 The court explained that “the [state’s]
paternity statutes provide a procedural template to challenge the
putative relationship between the infant and [the gestational
surrogate].”141 Three years later, in In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant
T., the same court ruled on the legal parentage of a child born through
gestational surrogacy using sperm from the intended father and donor
ova.142 The intended father, the surrogate, and the surrogate’s husband
jointly sought to disestablish the surrogate’s maternity,143 and the
intended father’s wife planned to subsequently pursue legal parentage
through the only avenue available to her, adoption.144 The court denied
the parties’ request to disestablish the maternity of the gestational
surrogate, holding that the “presumptive relationship [between the

of a child conceived using donor ova because maternity requires a gestational or genetic
connection to the child); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 3250 (Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009) (holding, in a case in which the intended
parents were a male same-sex couple, that the gestational surrogate’s maternity could
not be disestablished and noting that it was not a situation in which a court had to
“break a tie” between a gestational mother and a genetic mother); see also NeJaime,
supra note 18, at 2326 (“Yet in most states, the surrogate’s nonrecognition occurs only
when the intended mother is the genetic mother.”); supra note 134 (discussing cases in
which the surrogate’s maternity was disestablished). But see In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d
115, 130-31 (Md. 2007) (holding that the surrogate’s maternity could be disestablished
through a genetics-based avenue despite the lack of a genetic intended mother).
138 In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d at 60.
139 IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (2020).
140 In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d at 61-62.
141 Id. at 62.
142 In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d at 597.
143 Id.
144 See id. at 598 n.2.
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surrogate and child] will stand unless another woman establishes that
she is, in fact, the biological mother of the child.”145
These decisions reflect the modern trend in maternity determinations
involving gestational surrogacy agreements that the jurisdiction does
not recognize as enforceable. Namely, a conclusive presumption of legal
parentage attaches to the surrogate when donor ova are used to conceive
the child, but when ova from the intended mother are used, the
presumption of legal parentage that attaches to the surrogate can be
rebutted and disestablished on genetics-based grounds.146 The result is
that a surrogate is not a legal parent when ova from the intended mother
are used in conception, but is a legal parent when donor ova are used
in conception. When male same-sex couples seek to become parents via
gestational surrogacy, generally donor ova are used in conception and
no genetic intended mother exists. This means that in the typical
situation involving a male same-sex couple who has entered into a
surrogacy agreement that the relevant jurisdiction does not recognize
as enforceable, the presumption of legal parentage that attaches to the
surrogate is conclusive — it cannot be rebutted and disestablished
through genetics-based avenues.
The conclusive presumption of legal parentage that attaches to the
individual who gave birth when there is no genetic intended mother
poses a significant barrier to extending marriage-based avenues of
establishing parentage to male same-sex couples who conceive children
via surrogacy. First, since the person who gives birth automatically
attains the conclusive status of the child’s legal parent and most United
States jurisdictions recognize a maximum of two legal parents, it follows
that marriage-based presumptions of parentage logically would stem
only from the person who gave birth.147 If marriage-based presumptions
of parentage stemmed from anyone other than the person who gave
birth, such as the child’s biological father, then the state would be
opening the door for the simultaneous establishment of legal parentage
in more than two individuals. In situations in which the biological
father was married to someone other than the person who gave birth,
application of a marriage-based parentage presumption to the biological
father’s spouse would result in the concurrent establishment of legal
parentage in, at a minimum, the individual who gave birth, the

145

Id. at 601.
See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2311.
147 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 134 (“[T]he law in the vast
majority of states recognizes a maximum of two legal parents for each child.”).
146
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biological father, and the biological father’s spouse.148 Consequently,
the conclusive presumption of legal parentage that attaches to
individuals who give birth in the absence of a genetic intended mother
and the limit of two legal parents in most states result in a situation
where marriage-based parentage presumptions can flow only from the
person who gave birth.
In addition, as long as the presumption of legal parentage based upon
the act of giving birth is conclusive in the absence of a genetic intended
mother, generally rendering the surrogate a legal parent in surrogacy
arrangements involving male same-sex couples, adoption proceedings
will remain a necessary step for establishing the legal parentage of the
non-biological intended parent. Since most jurisdictions recognize a
maximum of two legal parents, before the non-biological intended
parent can establish legal parentage, the surrogate’s parental rights will
need to be terminated.149 Termination of a legal parent’s rights requires
a judicial proceeding.150 Unless the surrogate is deemed an unfit parent,
she will need to agree to the voluntary termination of her parental
rights,151 and there are very limited circumstances under which a legal
parent can voluntarily terminate their parental rights.152 Generally, this
may only occur in the context of an adoption proceeding wherein
someone else is seeking to assume the parental status occupied by the
parent whose rights are being terminated.153 As a result, the conclusive
presumption of legal parentage based upon the act of giving birth not
only makes the extension of marriage-based avenues of establishing
parentage to male same-sex couples untenable in jurisdictions that
recognize a maximum of two legal parents, but it also confines

148 If the individual who gave birth was married, a presumption of legal parentage
could also attach to their spouse.
149 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
150 See 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES
§ 13:21 (2020) (“An action for termination of parental rights or an adoption must still
be filed in order for the parent’s rights to be terminated.”).
151 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 119-21.
152 See id. at 120-21.
153 M. ELAINE BUCCIERI, JAMES BUCHWALTER, CECILY FUHR, STEPHEN LEASE, KARL
OAKES, & ERIC C. SURETTE, 43 C.J.S. INFANTS § 24 (2020) (“There is authority that a
parent may not voluntarily surrender his or her parental rights to a child in a context
other than the adoption of the child.”); Krista Sirola, Are You My Mother? Defending the
Rights of Intended Parents in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LAW 131, 139-40 (2006) (“Neither mothers nor fathers can
relinquish their parental rights voluntarily unless another intends to assume those
rights by adoption.”).
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parentage establishment for male same-sex couples to the adoption
realm.
B. Gender-Based Stereotypes, Beliefs, and Assumptions in the Parentage
Context
The failure to extend marriage-based avenues of parentage
establishment to male same-sex couples also likely stems from societal
beliefs about the differing roles of women and men;154 these beliefs have
both influenced, and been influenced by, the law. For most of the
nation’s history, the law has perpetuated and reinforced the belief that
men and women should have different familial roles, with women
responsible for the care of the home and children, and men responsible
for providing the household’s “[financial] support and its links to
external society.”155 For example, early laws, inter alia, required married
men to support their wives financially and married women to care for
the children and home,156 denied married women the right to hold
property or control any wages that they earned,157 capped the number
of hours women could work,158 and provided no protection against sexbased discrimination in the workplace.159 Until the 1970s, when the
Supreme Court began to interpret the Equal Protection Clause to
require heightened scrutiny for laws that made classifications on the
basis of sex, “sex-based classifications in family and employment law

154 See David Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 309, 350 (2019) (discussing the view that “gay-male couples are inadequate
parents, not only because of their sexual orientation, but also because their family is
missing an appropriate caregiver — a woman”); NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2330 (“Gay
men engaging in surrogacy challenge the centrality of the mother-child relationship in
ways that different-sex couples engaging in surrogacy do not.”) (citing GERALD P.
MALLON, GAY MEN CHOOSING PARENTHOOD 99 (2004)).
155 DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN, CATHERINE J. ROSS, DAVID D. MEYER & LINDA
C. MCCLAIN, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 169 (4th ed. 2015); see also Fontana &
Schoenbaum, supra note 154, at 316 (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women
Becoming Part of Constitution, 6 L. & INEQ. 17, 19 (1988)).
156 Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 213 (2007).
157 A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to
Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
69, 76-77 (1998); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United
States as a Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 269 (1997).
158 Ginsburg, supra note 157, at 269 (citing Muller v. Oregon, 2018 U.S. 412 (1908)).
159 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first federal law to prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sex. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 155, at 169.

1540

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 54:1507

aligned with gender norms to enforce an ideology of separate spheres
for men and women.”160
With regard to laws governing parental rights specifically, historically
these laws have reflected gendered beliefs and assumptions about the
parental and caretaking capabilities of women and men. For example,
in the context of custody disputes between mothers and fathers, by the
late nineteenth century, many states began to employ the tender years
doctrine, which required that mothers receive custody of children
under a certain age.161 This doctrine stemmed from the belief that only
mothers could properly nurture young children.162 It was not until the
1970s that courts started to strike down state custody laws employing
the tender years doctrine based upon “emerging constitutional law
concerning gender equality.”163 Moreover, it was not until 1972 that the
Supreme Court, in Stanley v. Illinois, struck down as unconstitutional
state laws that set forth a conclusive presumption that all unmarried
biological fathers were “unsuitable and neglectful parents” who were
unfit to care for their children, and left children of unmarried fathers
wards of the state when their mother, due to death or other
circumstances, was unable to care for them.164
Although parentage law began moving towards greater gender
equality in the 1970s and 1980s, the law continued to reflect gendered
beliefs about the parental roles and caretaking capabilities of women
and men by providing biological fathers who were not married to the
child’s mother with fewer rights and protections than any other category
of biological parents. Following Stanley, a series of cases decided by the
Supreme Court established the “biology plus” standard for determining
whether a biological father who is not married to the child’s mother
shares a constitutionally protected relationship with the child.165 Under
160 Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 721
(2012).
161 ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 155, at 803.
162 See id.
163 Id. Today, while custody laws do not explicitly set forth gender-based
preferences, and many states have statutory provisions stating that the court may not
give preference to one parent over the other on the basis of gender, many people argue
that gender stereotypes continue to pervade custody decisions. See Jessica Feinberg,
Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child Custody Disputes Between Same-Sex Parents:
Fair or Foul?, 81 MO. L. REV. 331, 357 (2016).
164 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654, 656-57 (1972).
165 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983) (finding a biological
connection plus acceptance of parental responsibility to be sufficient for constitutional
protection); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979) (holding a substantial
parent-child relationship should lead to ease in identifying the father even if the child
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this standard, the biological father establishes a constitutionally
protected parent-child relationship only if he “grasps the opportunity”
to develop a relationship with his child and “demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by com[ing] forward
to participate in the rearing of his child.”166 While the biology plus
standard provided significantly greater protections for biological fathers
who are not married to the child’s mother than they had previously
enjoyed, it is notable that no other categories of biological parents need
to make this type of showing in order to receive constitutional
protection for the parent-child relationship. With regard to biological
mothers, whether married or unmarried, “all of the [Supreme Court’s]
fatherhood cases assumed that the birth of a child establishes the
mother’s rights.”167 In terms of biological fathers who are married to the
child’s mother, the Supreme Court has suggested that they enjoy greater
constitutional protections than unmarried fathers.168 The Court has
indicated that if the biology plus standard applies to married biological
fathers,169 they may be presumed to have satisfied the standard by virtue
of having shared an intact marital relationship and familial home with
the mother and child for a period of time.170

is born out of wedlock); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (failing to
recognize a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship due to the father’s
failure to take significant responsibility of the child).
166 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392) (internal quotations
omitted).
167 Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429,
441 (2007); see also Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers
Abroad and at Home, 36 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 405, 436 (2013) (stating that in Lehr, “the
only relevant criterion for the mother was, by default, the fact that she gave birth to her
child; just the father had to supplement the fact of biology with the establishment of a
perceptible relationship”).
168 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16 (stating that although “[i]n some circumstances the
actual relationship between father and child may suffice to create in the unwed father
parental interests comparable to those of the married father . . . the absence of a legal
tie with the mother may . . . appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive
constitutional claims might otherwise exist by virtue of the father’s actual relationship
with the children” (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
169 Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against Genetic Entitlement,
91 TUL. L. REV. 473, 505 n.126 (2017) (“The Supreme Court, however, has suggested
that the biology-plus-relationship may apply to all fathers.”) (emphasis added).
170 See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256 (referring to a “married father who is separated or
divorced from the mother and is no longer living with his child” and stating that “even
a father whose marriage has broken apart will have borne full responsibility for the
rearing of his children during the period of the marriage”); see also Nancy E. Dowd,
Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J.
1271, 1307 (2005) (“The strong protection of marital fathers seems presumed within
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Notably, after the Stanley line of cases, a subsequent Supreme Court
decision established that for biological fathers who are not married to
the child’s mother, even satisfaction of the biology plus standard does
not guarantee constitutional protection for the parent-child relationship
when there is a competing claim of parentage from a man who is
married to the child’s mother.171 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme
Court addressed a biological father’s claim that it was unconstitutional
for California to categorically deny biological fathers standing to
challenge the marital presumption.172 The plurality opinion, in
determining that the biological father’s constitutional rights had not
been violated, set forth the proposition that the constitutional
protections afforded to unmarried biological fathers who satisfy the
biology plus standard do not extend to a man who fathers a child with
a woman who is married to another man.173 Consequently, although the
biological father had formed a relationship with the child that satisfied
the biology plus standard, it was constitutional to establish the husband
of the child’s mother as the legal father on the basis of his marriage to
the child’s mother.174
The different avenues available today for establishing paternity
depending on the man’s relationship to the child’s mother further
illuminate parentage law’s continued adherence to gender-based
stereotypes and assumptions.175 As discussed above, in terms of married
men, every state employs a presumption that the husband of the woman
who gave birth is the child’s legal parent.176 For a man who wishes to
establish his legal parentage but is not married to the child’s birth
mother, the most efficient, simple, and inexpensive method of doing so
is through a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (“VAP”) executed
jointly with the child’s mother (often at the hospital immediately
following the child’s birth).177 Federal law mandates that VAPs be
offered by all birthing hospitals and birth records offices,178 and after

decisions protecting family privacy that especially accord a high value to marriage, as
well as decisions upholding parental rights against state intrusion.”).
171 See infra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
172 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989).
173 Id. at 123-24.
174 Id. at 129-30.
175 See Appleton, supra note 44, at 282-83 (“Still, fatherhood remains, in significant
part, a ‘secondary’ or derivative relationship that requires an initial determination of the
child’s first or ‘primary’ parent, the mother.”).
176 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
177 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 106 n.27.
178 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(1) (2020).
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sixty days the VAP must be considered “a legal finding of paternity.”179
Importantly, men cannot establish parentage through VAPs without the
birth mother’s express, written consent.180 It is also noteworthy that
neither marital presumption standards nor VAP procedures require the
man to prove that he is genetically connected to the child in order to
establish his legal parentage.181
If a biological father is not married to the child’s birth mother and the
birth mother is unwilling to execute a VAP, he must pursue legal
proceedings to establish parentage based upon his biological connection
to the child.182 Moreover, if the mother is married to someone else and
does not wish for the biological father to establish parentage, the
biological father must bring a legal action to challenge the marital
presumption of parentage that applies to the mother’s husband.183
Although a majority of states now grant biological fathers standing to
challenge the marital presumption, proof of a genetic connection to the
child does not guarantee that the biological father will be able to
establish legal paternity.184 Courts may deny rebuttal of the marital
presumption when it is deemed contrary to equitable principles or the
best interests of the child, and many states place time restrictions on
actions to challenge the marital presumption.185
Basically, the law continues to make it significantly easier for men,
regardless of their biological connection to the child, to establish legal
parentage when they are, or are perceived to be, undertaking parentage
with the involvement of the child’s birth mother.186 If a man is married
to the child’s birth mother, which is likely perceived as the strongest
guarantee that the birth mother will be significantly involved in any
179

42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii) (2018).
See Hendricks, supra note 169, at 517.
181 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 127; supra Part I.A.
182 Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent?, supra note 4, at 85.
183 In some states, the biological father’s paternity can be established through the
VAP even if the birth mother is married to someone else. This usually involves the birth
mother, her husband, and the biological father together executing the VAP. Feinberg,
A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 128-29 n.158. This, of course, requires the birth
mother’s consent. See id.
184 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 38, at 252-54.
185 Id.
186 See Appleton, supra note 44, at 282 (“[F]atherhood has long been constructed as
a status stemming from a man’s legally recognized relationship to a child’s mother.
Although the required legal relationship to the mother often coincides with a genetic
relationship to the child, traditionally the genetic relationship was neither necessary nor
sufficient to trigger legal paternity.”); see also Hendricks, supra note 169, at 517 (“The
VAP process thus substitutes for marriage by allowing for the creation of a coparenting
relationship by mutual consent.”).
180
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caretaking the man undertakes, he does not have to take any steps at all
to establish parentage.187 If a man is not married to the birth mother but
she consents to his establishment of parentage, which is likely perceived
as the next best indication that the birth mother will be involved in the
caretaking undertaken by the man, the man merely has to execute a
document to establish parentage.188 However, if the man does not share
a marital or cooperative relationship with the birth mother, which is
likely perceived as a strong indication that the caretaking he undertakes
will not occur in the presence of the birth mother, he must pursue legal
proceedings to establish his parentage and prove that he is the child’s
biological father.189 Even if a man is able to prove a biological tie to the
child, that may not be enough to establish his parentage. As the
Supreme Court’s decision in Michael H. demonstrated, parentage claims
stemming from a man’s marriage to the child’s birth mother may
outweigh parentage claims stemming from a man’s biological and social
connections to the child.190
The differing standards for parentage establishment for men who are
perceived to be part of a parenting unit with the child’s biological
mother, as opposed to those who are not, likely stem, at least in part,
from the lingering discomfort about the ability (or lack thereof) of men
to care for children without the presence of the biological mother.
While the desire to provide children with a “unitary family” certainly is
part of the reason for encouraging the establishment of parentage in
men who are married to or in a relationship with the child’s biological
mother,191 the preference for raising children within unitary families
cannot be the only reason that the law is structured in this manner. This
becomes clear when one considers that the promotion of the unitary
family through the laws governing parentage establishment only works
in one direction. Specifically, if the biological mother is part of a unitary
family, the law promotes the establishment of parentage in her spouse
or partner.192 Conversely, if the biological father is part of a unitary
family, the law does not promote the establishment of parentage in his
spouse or partner — even if the biological father is the only biological

187

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
190 See Dowd, supra note 170, at 1305-06 (“Marital fatherhood, even when
nonbiological, is clearly preferred by the Court . . . .”).
191 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989).
192 See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
188
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parent who would provide the child with a unitary family.193 The
differing standards for paternity establishment based upon a man’s
relationship to the child’s biological mother reflect the gendered belief
that men cannot or will not provide adequate caregiving without the
presence and involvement of the biological mother. Overall, while many
of the laws that explicitly employed sex-based stereotypes have been
struck down over the years, parentage law continues to reflect genderrelated assumptions in more subtle ways.194
It is perhaps then unsurprising that the belief that it is essential for
children to have a mother present and serving as the primary caretaker,
a belief which the law long promoted and reinforced, remains prevalent
in modern society.195 Polls conducted in recent years by the Pew
Research Center highlight that large segments of society maintain
gendered beliefs about parenting. For example, while 51% of
respondents in a recent poll stated that they believed children were
better off when their mother was a stay-at-home mother who did not
work outside the home, only 8% of respondents held the same belief
about fathers.196 When the question focused on parents of young
children, 80% of respondents stated that the ideal situation for mothers
with young children was that they either work part-time or not at all,
while only 24% of respondents felt the same way about fathers with
young children.197 This recent research regarding societal views of
parenting roles indicates that the presence of a mother in a primary
caretaking role is still viewed by a large segment of society as essential
to children’s development, and that this belief does not extend to
fathers.

193 Parentage establishment through marriage-based presumptions of parentage and
VAPs stems from an individual’s relationship to the person who gave birth as opposed
to an individual’s relationship to the child’s biological father. See supra notes 37, 67,
177–80 and accompanying text.
194 See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 170, at 1280-90 (discussing immigration law decisions
that reflect gender-based assumptions around parentage).
195 See id. at 1271 (“[S]tereotypes of fathers run deep despite changing constitutional
norms.”); Widiss, supra note 160, at 739 (“The reforms of the 1970s eliminated the role
that sex-based classifications played in enforcing the traditional gendered divide. It was
expected that these changes would in turn transform the gendered ideology that
underlay them. This has proven an elusive goal.”).
196 WENDY WANG, KIM PARKER & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., BREADWINNER
MOMS 2-3 (2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/
05/Breadwinner_moms_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q3ZW-W6EL].
197 KIM PARKER & WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD app. 4 at
58 (2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/03/modern_
parenthood_topline_03-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/23CJ-66VW].
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The gendered societal beliefs that persist in the parentage context
stem from a number of common assumptions, stereotypes, and
generalizations about the differing parental and caretaking dispositions,
capabilities, and practices of women and men.198 As an initial matter,
there is the persistent assumption that fathers cannot or will not be as
caring or nurturing as mothers.199 Similarly, another lingering
assumption is that men cannot or will not form as strong of bonds with
their children as women.200 Other persistent stereotypes are that women
are more responsible parents than men and are more capable than men
at performing the tasks involved in day-to-day caregiving.201 Indeed, in
several studies, stay-at-home fathers were viewed as less competent
caregivers than stay-at-home mothers.202 In addition to the stereotypes
and assumptions about men in general, there are also stereotypes more
specific to gay men that cast a negative light on their caretaking abilities,
including that they are “anti-family”203 and have commitment issues.204

198 See Dowd, supra note 170, at 1272 (describing “a deep negative societal bias
about men’s caregiving”).
199 See ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, GAY DADS: TRANSITIONS TO ADOPTIVE FATHERHOOD 12
(2012) (citation omitted) (“Women as mothers are presumed to be nurturing, caring,
and self-sacrificing, whereas men as fathers are presumed to be more practical, less
emotional, and strongly committed to paid employment.”); Dowd, supra note 170, at
1284 (“This idea is grounded in a stereotype that men, or most men, will not nurture
children.”).
200 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I believe
that a State is fully justified in concluding, on the basis of common human experience,
that the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger
bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting from the male’s often casual
encounter.”); see also Abigail Millings, Angela Rowe & Judi Walsh, Do Mothers Really
Have Stronger Bonds with Their Children than Fathers Do?, CONVERSATION (Apr. 20, 2016,
5:40 AM EDT), http://theconversation.com/do-mothers-really-have-stronger-bondswith-their-children-than-fathers-do-57590 [http://perma.cc/5MAM-W9AG].
201 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 666 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Centuries of human
experience buttress this view of the realities of human conditions and suggest that
unwed mothers of illegitimate children are generally more dependable protectors of
their children than are unwed fathers.”); id. at 654 (majority opinion) (“It may be, as
the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents.”);
Dowd, supra note 170, at 1275 (describing “outdated stereotypes about men as
incapable, incompetent caregivers”).
202 Ruth Gaunt, Breadwinning Moms, Caregiving Dads: Double Standard in Social
Judgments of Gender Norm Violators, 34 J. FAM. ISSUES 3, 6, 9-10 (2013).
203 Dana Berkowitz, A Sociohistorical Analysis of Gay Men’s Procreative Consciousness,
in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTING: NEW DIRECTIONS 157, 159 (Fiona Tasker & Jerry J.
Bigner eds., 2007).
204 See E. Gary Spitko, From Queer to Paternity: How Primary Gay Fathers Are
Changing Fatherhood and Gay Identity, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 195, 207 (2005).
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Laws that exclude male same-sex couples from establishing both
members as legal parents through non-adoptive avenues directly reflect
the persistent gendered beliefs, assumptions, and stereotypes that
continue to exist around parenting and caretaking.205 For example, laws
that provide parentage based upon the act of giving birth and set forth
marriage-based presumptions stemming only from the person who
gives birth reflect the view that identifying the biological mother as the
child’s first legal parent is the critical initial step that parentage law must
undertake.206 While marriage-based presumptions of parentage have
been extended to encompass both male and female spouses of women
who give birth, i.e., situations in which it is guaranteed that at least one
of the child’s two legal parents will be a woman who is biologically
connected to the child — they have not been extended to the spouses
of biological fathers.207 In addition, laws that maintain parentage in the
woman who gives birth unless there is a genetic intended mother or, in
some jurisdictions, simply an intended mother for whom pregnancy
carries substantial risks, reflect the view that providing children with at
least one legal parent who is a woman is essential. These laws
demonstrate that while it is not always essential to provide parentage to
the woman who gives birth, it is essential to establish legal parentage in
at least one individual who can be identified as a “mother,” a term which
is construed narrowly in some of these jurisdictions as a woman who is
biologically or genetically connected to the child, and more broadly in
others as a woman who intends to raise the child but for whom
pregnancy carries substantial risks.208 In sum, the law governing
parentage establishment for male same-sex couples, which reflects
problematic gender-based stereotypes, beliefs, and assumptions, is in
critical need of reform.

205 See Appleton, supra note 44, at 292 (“Aside from the practical difficulties, the
different treatment marginalizes male couples and sends a signal that nurturing and
parenting do not come ‘naturally’ to gay men.”).
206 Adler, supra note 79, at 18 (“Pavan grounds the second parent’s rights in marriage
to the birth mother, whose rights go entirely unquestioned; birth mother rights serve as
a premise rather than a conclusion. A married gay male couple cannot possibly be
treated the same as a married heterosexual or lesbian couple unless and until the law
dispenses with that remarkably durable — if barely visible — starting place.”);
Appleton, supra note 44, at 282 (“[F]atherhood remains, in significant part, a
‘secondary’ or derivative relationship that requires an initial determination of the child’s
first or ‘primary’ parent, the mother.”); NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2329 (“[T]he mother
remains the parental figure who establishes the family, while the father is a secondary,
optional parent, potentially supplementing but certainly not replacing the mother.”).
207 See supra Part II.
208 See supra Part II.
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IV. WHY THE LAW SHOULD EXTEND NON-ADOPTIVE MARRIAGE-BASED
AVENUES OF ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE TO MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES
A. Remedying the Unwarranted, Unnecessary Harm to Male Same-Sex
Couples and their Children Resulting from Current Parentage Law
Excluding male same-sex couples who conceive children via
surrogacy from non-adoptive marriage-based avenues to establishing
parentage and requiring them to undertake adoption in order to
establish parentage for the non-biological intended parent results in
unwarranted, unnecessary harm to male same-sex couples and their
children.209 Generally, in a stepparent adoption, which married male
same-sex couples nationwide may now utilize pursuant to Obergefell,
the spouse of the child’s legal parent can adopt the child and the legal
parent can maintain his or her parentage provided that if the child
already has a second legal parent, they have consented to the
termination of their parental rights.210 However, because in most
jurisdictions the law conclusively presumes that the surrogate is a legal
parent if no genetic intended mother exists, stepparent adoption
represents a viable avenue for male same-sex couples to establish the
non-biological intended parent’s legal parentage only when the
surrogate is willing to surrender her parental rights.211 Despite the prior
execution of a surrogacy contract in which the surrogate agreed to
relinquish her parental rights, unless there is a judicial determination
that the surrogate is an unfit parent whose rights are subject to
involuntarily termination, the stepparent adoption cannot occur
without the surrogate’s consent.212 While in the vast majority of cases
the surrogate is willing to surrender her parental rights in accordance
with the surrogacy contract,213 in the rare instances when the surrogate

209 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2308, 2313 (describing this approach as
“consistent with the approach of most other states” and further stating that “[i]n most
states, nonbiological fathers in same-sex couples cannot establish parentage without
adoption, even when they are married”).
210 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 110.
211 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2320 (“While adoption will ultimately yield legal
parentage for some, it may be impossible for others, meaning that legal recognition
remains out of reach. Terminating the rights of the individual presumed by law to be
the parent may not be feasible.”).
212 See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
213 See Snyder & Byrn, supra note 108, at 643 n.27 (citing Deborah Morgenstern
Katz, Womb for Rent, PARENTING MAG., Dec./Jan. 2002, at 86); see also Joanna L.
Grossman, Time to Revisit Baby M.? A New Jersey Court Refuses to Enforce a Surrogacy
Agreement, Part Two, FINDLAW (Jan. 20, 2010), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-
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changes her mind, the stepparent adoption requirement effectively
prevents married male same-sex couples from establishing both
members of the couple as the child’s legal parents.
Even when the surrogate is willing to relinquish her parental rights,
the stepparent adoption process can be expensive, lengthy, and
burdensome.214 Specifically, “many individuals require the assistance of
an attorney to navigate the process, and the procedure often requires
submitting various documents, paying court fees, appearing in court,
submitting to a background check, and undergoing some form of postplacement supervision.”215 Some courts also require financial
accountings and invasive home studies.216 Stepparent adoptions can
cost several thousand dollars and may take months to complete.217
Couples who lack the resources or knowledge necessary to complete
the stepparent adoption process will be excluded from establishing legal
parentage for the non-biological intended parent.
Importantly, until the adoption is completed, the non-biological
intended parent is not a legal parent and thus lacks the myriad rights
and obligations that accompany legal parentage, including, for example,
medical decision-making and custodial rights as well as support
obligations.218 This leaves both the child and the non-biological
intended parent without essential rights and protections and in a state
of limbo.219 If the couple’s relationship ends before the adoption is
completed, the non-biological intended parent, a legal stranger to the
child at that point, will be left completely “at the mercy of [their] former
partner.”220 Requiring married male same-sex couples to pursue
adoption in order for the non-biological intended parent to establish
legal parentage also sends a harmful, problematic message to the non-

commentary/time-to-revisit-baby-m-a-new-jersey-court-refuses-to-enforce-a-surrogacyagreement-part-two.html [http://perma.cc/L3P7-HVJ3].
214 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 110-11.
215 Id.
216 See, e.g., Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065 (S.D. Ind. 2016)
(“[Plaintiff] is seeking a stepparent adoption. She is required to undergo fingerprinting
and a criminal background check in addition to submitting her driving record, her
financial profile, and the veterinary records for any pet living in the home. A home study
is being conducted, which examines the relationship history of [plaintiff and her wife],
requires them to write an autobiography and to discuss their parenting philosophy, and
requires them to open their home for inspection. The cost for their stepparent adoption
is approximately $4,200.00 . . . .”).
217 NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2317.
218 See id. at 2317-18.
219 See id. at 2318.
220 Id. at 2320.
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biological intended parent and society at large. The message is that the
non-biological parent is not a “real” parent but instead is a “parental
substitute[] who must formally replace the biological parent[] [(here
the surrogate)] through adoption.”221 This message is likely to further
stigmatize families headed by male same-sex couples and lead to
feelings of insecurity and inferiority for the non-biological intended
parent.
The harm to male same-sex couples and their families resulting from
the denial of marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage is
unwarranted — there is a wide body of social science research
indicating that the skills and abilities required to successfully raise
children exist in both men and women and in both different- and samesex couples. Specifically, studies have demonstrated that men who serve
as primary caretakers to their children are as capable as women who
serve in that role and that children raised by male same-sex couples
function as well as children raised by different-sex couples and female
same-sex couples across an array of measures.222 In terms of the findings
of studies involving men who are primary caretakers for their children,
“[t]he most critical fact that emerges about how men parent is that
when men do nurture children as a primary parent, men parent
essentially like mothers. Men parent as well as women do, and their way
of parenting is not unique.”223 As Professor Nancy Dowd has explained,
the research indicates that “[g]ood parenting is neither sex-specific nor
sex-related.”224
With regard to studies of children raised by gay and lesbian parents,
as the American Sociological Association has explained,
The clear and consistent social science consensus is that
children raised by same-sex parents fare just as well as children
raised by different-sex parents. Decades of methodologically
sound social science research, including multiple nationally
representative studies and expert evidence introduced in courts
around the country, confirm that positive child wellbeing is the
product of stability in the relationship between the two parents,
stability in the relationship between the parents and the child,
and sufficient parental socioeconomic resources. The wellbeing

221

Id. at 2319.
See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text.
223 Dowd, supra note 170, at 1317; see also NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD
46, 83 (2000).
224 Dowd, supra note 170, at 1318.
222
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of children does not depend on the sex or sexual orientation of
their parents.225
Specifically, research indicates that children of same-sex parents scored
as well as or better than children of different-sex parents on measures
such as mental health, cognitive development, psychological
adjustment, academic success, quality of the parent-child relationship,
and overall well-being.226 As a result, leading social science and medical
organizations, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics, the
American Medical Association, the American Psychological
Association, and the American Sociological Association, have issued
statements expressing support for the legal recognition of same-sex
parents.227
Moreover, the substantial burden that married male same-sex couples
and surrogates bear as a result of a legal framework that requires an
adoption procedure in order for the surrogate’s rights to be terminated
and the non-biological intended parent’s rights to be established is an
unnecessary, counterproductive one. Disputes over parentage in the
surrogacy context are rare — “[i]t is anecdotally reported that, of the
estimated 14,000 to 16,000 surrogacies completed through 2002, only
88 resulted in disputes over parentage.”228 When the law requires an
adoption procedure in order for the surrogate’s parentage to be
terminated and the non-biological intended parent’s parentage to be
established, it forces legal parentage on the surrogate against her wishes
and denies parental rights to the child’s non-biological intended parent
225 Brief for American Sociological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 2, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14571, 14-574).
226 See Alicia Crowl, Soyeon Ahn & Jean Baker, A Meta-Analysis of Developmental
Outcomes for Children of Same-Sex and Heterosexual Parents, 4 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 385,
398 (2008); Suzanne A. Kim & Edward Stein, Gender in the Context of Same-Sex Divorce
and Relationship Dissolution, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 384, 390 n.25 (2018).
227 See EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., EXPANDING RESOURCES FOR WAITING
CHILDREN II: ELIMINATING LEGAL AND PRACTICE BARRIERS TO GAY AND LESBIAN ADOPTION
FROM FOSTER CARE app. B at 42-44 (2008), http://web.archive.org/web/
20190807143323/http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/ExpandingResources.pdf [http://perma.
cc/B7EW-JRLU]; see, e.g., Brief for American Sociological Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 225 (arguing that legalizing same-sex marriage will
promote the wellbeing of the children of same-sex couples).
228 Snyder & Byrn, supra note 108, at 643 n.27 (citing Deborah Morgenstern Katz,
Womb for Rent, PARENTING MAG., Dec./Jan. 2002, at 86). Notably, “of those 88 cases,
only 23 were reported to be surrogates who wanted to keep the child (often simply to
leverage better contract terms), while the remaining 65 were intended parents who were
unable or did not want to complete the agreement (because of divorce, death of one of
the intended parents, nature or condition of the child, etc.).” Id.
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until the costly, intrusive adoption process is completed. It is also
deeply problematic that in many jurisdictions, despite the fact that the
surrogate’s relationship to the child is exactly the same in either
scenario, the surrogate avoids legal parentage if the intended mother’s
ova were used in conception but is conclusively deemed the child’s legal
parent if the intended parents utilized donor ova.229 Extending
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex
couples who conceive children via surrogacy would better and more
efficiently effectuate the intent of all of the parties involved in the
surrogacy agreement in the overwhelming majority of cases.230
In addition, it is already well entrenched under current law that an
individual who does not share a genetic connection to a child may
establish legal parentage on the basis of their marriage to the child’s
biological parent. Across the country, marital presumption laws
establish parentage for the different- or same-sex spouse of an
individual who conceives or gives birth to a child during the
marriage.231 Similarly, spousal consent to assisted reproduction laws
across the country provide parentage to married individuals who, with
the intent to be the resulting child’s parent, consent to their same- or
different-sex spouse’s use of assisted reproduction to conceive a child.232
Extending marriage-based parentage establishment avenues to male
same-sex couples who conceive via surrogacy would be a logical
expansion of these existing laws. Furthermore, while extending
marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex
couples would require legal recognition that giving birth does not
necessarily conclusively establish an individual’s parentage, this also is
not a new concept. In allowing genetic intended mothers in the
surrogacy context to establish their parentage and to rebut and
disestablish the surrogate’s parentage through non-adoptive avenues,
the law in many states already recognizes that giving birth does not
always conclusively establish legal parentage.233
Finally, denying male same-sex couples access to non-adoptive
marriage-based avenues to establishing parentage runs afoul of the
modern justifications for maintaining marriage-based parentage
presumptions. As discussed above, there are a number of justifications
for marriage-based parentage presumptions that remain relevant today.
These justifications include protecting the integrity of marriages,
229
230
231
232
233

See supra notes 134–46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
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fostering marital harmony and unity, promoting childrearing within
marriage, and providing stable homes for children.234 Each of these
justifications supports the application of marriage-based avenues of
establishing parentage to all married couples, regardless of the genders
of the spouses.
B. Dismantling Harmful Gender-Based Stereotypes
Extending non-adoptive marriage-based avenues to establishing
parentage to male same-sex couples falls within the scope of the type of
legal reform that will help to dismantle harmful and confining genderbased stereotypes and expectations. This certainly is not to say that
extending marriage-based parentage to male same-sex couples will, on
its own, dismantle the gender-based stereotypes embedded in our laws
and society — it will not. However, adopting laws such as this that
challenge existing gender stereotypes and expectations around
parenting and caretaking is undoubtedly important, and, if done on a
large enough scale, will result in meaningful change. Broadly speaking,
laws that recognize men as caretakers will help women in a number of
ways, both in the workplace and in the domestic sphere. It is well
established that women face discrimination in the workplace based
upon assumptions about their current or future familial roles and
caretaking responsibilities. As Professor Vicki Shultz has explained,
“[h]istorically, workplace inequalities between men and women have
been based on a biased set of attitudes and assumptions casting women
as secondary workers . . . [who] are committed first and foremost to
their domestic roles.”235 Many employers continue to assume that
women are, will be, or should be primarily responsible for the care of
their home and family members, and that men are, will be, or should be
primarily responsible for supporting their families financially.236 As a
result, employers often view women as both less committed to their
careers and less competent at their jobs than their male counterparts.237
234

See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 101011 (2015).
236 See Claire Cain Miller, The Motherhood Penalty vs. the Fatherhood Bonus, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/upshot/a-child-helps-yourcareer-if-youre-a-man.html [http://perma.cc/UT8F-RTFT].
237 Schultz, supra note 235, at 1011 (discussing the assumption that “women do not
have the same level of commitment to paid work as men, nor do they develop the same
level of work competence . . . .”); see Dania Y. Pulido, When Giving Birth Becomes a
Liability: The Intersection of Reproductive Oppression and the Motherhood Wage Penalty
for Latinas in Texas, 19 SCHOLAR 111, 136 (2017) (“According to a gender inequality
235
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These assumptions lead to discrimination against women in, inter alia,
hiring, promotion, pay, and retention.238
Today, 42% of women report experiencing gender-based
discrimination in the workplace,239 and women are severely
underrepresented in leadership positions across a wide array of fields.240
A significant gender wage gap persists in the United States, with women
who work fulltime earning only approximately 80% as much as men
who work fulltime; the wage gap is substantially larger for Black, Latina,
and Hispanic women.241 Across a variety of fields and types of jobs,
“women regularly are paid less than men working in the same
occupation.”242 As a 2013 report from the National Equal Pay Task
Force explains, “the gender pay gap exists for women working full time
as well as part time, and begins when women are first employed, which
is often well before they have children.”243
For women who are also mothers, the discriminatory treatment
stemming from gendered assumptions and beliefs around caretaking is
study, employers even questioned childless women’s career commitment because they
perceived such women as prospective mothers.”).
238 See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, (Un)Equal Protection: Why Gender Equality
Depends on Discrimination, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 49 (2014); see also Shirley Lin, “And
Ain’t I a Woman?”: Feminism, Immigrant Caregivers, and New Frontiers for Equality, 39
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 67, 71 (2016).
239 Kim Parker & Cary Funk, Gender Discrimination Comes in Many Forms for Today’s
Working Women, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/12/14/gender-discrimination-comes-in-many-forms-for-todays-workingwomen/ [http://perma.cc/ECF2-UGBU].
240 Judith Warner, Nora Ellmann & Diana Boesch, The Women’s Leadership Gap,
CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2018, 9:04 AM), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
women/reports/2018/11/20/461273/womens-leadership-gap-2/ [https://perma.cc/33VS926D].
241 See Sonam Sheth, Shayanne Gal, Madison Hoff & Marguerite Ward, 7 Charts that
Show the Glaring Gap Between Men’s and Women’s Salaries in the US, BUS. INSIDER (Aug.
26, 2020, 10:51 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/gender-wage-pay-gap-charts2017-3 [http://perma.cc/58QN-M8QF]; see also Taylor Stoneman, International
Economic Law, Gender Equality, and Paternity Leave: Can the WTO Be Utilized to Balance
the Division of Care Labor Worldwide?, 32 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 51, 58-59 (2017).
242 NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, FIFTY YEARS AFTER THE EQUAL PAY ACT: ASSESSING
THE PAST, TAKING STOCK OF THE FUTURE 28 (2013), http://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/equalpay/equal_pay_task_force_progress_report_june_
2013_new.pdf [http://perma.cc/NWX3-4WQZ].
243 Id. (citing Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Michael R. Richards, Chiu-Fang Chou, & Susan
E. Gerber, The $16,819 Pay Gap for Newly Trained Physicians: The Unexplained Trend of
Men Earning More Than Women, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 193, 193 (2011)); see also U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE
AND SALARY WORKERS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION AND SEX 1-10 (2019),
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf [http://perma.cc/8EMH-SVXY].
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even more pronounced. As compared to women without children,
mothers receive lower wages, are less likely to be hired and promoted,
are perceived as less competent, and are subjected to “harsher
performance and punctuality standards.”244 Fathers, on the other hand,
are more likely than childless men to be hired, and men tend to receive
higher wages after they have children.245 While employers tend to
assume that men who are fathers will be more committed to their work
in order to provide financially for their families, women who are
mothers are perceived as less committed to their work and “more
distractible when on the job.”246 In one study, women whose resumes
indicated that they were parents (by mentioning membership in a
parent-teacher association) were half as likely to receive interview
invitations as women whose otherwise identical resumes did not
indicate that they were parents.247 Men whose resumes indicated that
they were parents, however, were actually slightly more likely to receive
interview invitations than men whose resumes did not indicate that they
were parents.248 In a related study, when participants were placed in the
role of an employer and asked how much they would pay job applicants,
“[m]others were offered on average $11,000 less than childless women
and $13,000 less than fathers.”249 Research also indicates that, after
controlling for the usual occupational and human capital factors that
affect wages, working women in the United States receive, on average,
a 5% wage penalty per child.250
Moreover, at home, women are still engaging in a greater share of
housework and caretaking. Although men are performing more
caretaking and housework than in the past, mothers today spend
approximately twice the amount of time caring for their children as
fathers, and women spend eight more hours than men completing

244 Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood
Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1316 (2007); see Gaunt, supra note 202, at 5-6; Pulido,
supra note 237, at 135; see also ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 155, at 196. The degree of the
motherhood penalty varies by race. Research indicates that the motherhood wage
penalty for Black and Latina women, for example, may be less. Id. (citing Asmara M.
Tekle, The “Non-Maternal Wall” and Women of Color in High Governmental Office, 35 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 169, 175-78 (2010)).
245 Miller, supra note 236; see Miranda McGowan, The Parent Trap: Equality, Sex and
Partnership in the Modern Law Firm, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (2019).
246 Miller, supra note 236.
247 See Correll et al., supra note 244, at 1329-30.
248 See id. at 1330.
249 Miller, supra note 236.
250 Correll et al., supra note 244, at 1297.
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housework each week.251 Furthermore, even though couples in which
both members work fulltime increasingly report sharing equally in
childcare and housework, among these couples mothers are still
significantly more likely than fathers to be doing a greater share of the
work involved in raising children and maintaining the household.252 In
addition, women are significantly more likely than men to interrupt
their careers in order to care for a child or family member.253 In a 2013
Pew Research Poll, a significantly higher percentage of mothers as
compared to fathers indicated that they had reduced their hours at
work, taken a substantial amount of time off from work, or quit their
jobs in order to care for a child or family member.254
Legal reform such as that proposed in this Article that recognizes the
caretaking disposition and capabilities of men sends a message that
directly contradicts gender-based stereotypes and assumptions around
caretaking responsibilities that harm and confine women.255 In allowing
male same-sex couples to establish legal parentage through the
marriage-based avenues available to different-sex couples and female
same-sex couples, the law would be recognizing that caretaking is not a
“woman’s role,” but rather a role that can be, and is, fulfilled by both

251 PEW RES. CTR, CHAPTER 5: AMERICANS’ TIME AT PAID WORK, HOUSEWORK, CHILD
CARE, 1965 TO 2011, at 6 (Paul Taylor ed., 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2013/03/14/chapter-5-americans-time-at-paid-work-housework-child-care-1965-to2011/ [http://perma.cc/XXH2-EHAA] (“Despite the increase in child care time,
American mothers still spend about twice as much time with their children as fathers
do. In 2011, child care time was 7.3 hours per week for fathers and 13.5 hours per week
for mothers.”).
252 See Raising Kids and Running a Household: How Working Parents Share the Load,
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/11/04/raising-kidsand-running-a-household-how-working-parents-share-the-load/ [http://perma.cc/3TZ4LLHE].
253 Kim Parker, Women More than Men Adjust Their Careers for Family Life, PEW RES.
CTR. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/01/women-morethan-men-adjust-their-careers-for-family-life/ [http://perma.cc/4KHL-MCDC] (“In a
2013 survey, we found that mothers were much more likely than fathers to report
experiencing significant career interruptions in order to attend to their families’
needs.”).
254 See On Pay Gap, Millennial Women Near Parity – For Now, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec.
11, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/11/on-pay-gap-millennial-womennear-parity-for-now/ [http://perma.cc/XA33-NY56].
255 See Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 154, at 311 (“Unsexing the law of
caregiving has been crucial to dismantling the separate sex-based spheres that
pigeonhole women as caregivers and men as breadwinners and that have been so
harmful to sex equality.”).
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women and men.256 Legal reform that promotes messages like this, if
accomplished on a broad enough scale, will help to dismantle the
“stereotype that only women are responsible for family caregiving.”257
As legal and societal recognition that caretaking is not a gender-specific
role increases, employers will be less likely to resort to the harmful
gender-based beliefs and assumptions around caretaking that have
plagued women in the workplace.258
Legal reform that recognizes men as fully capable, nurturing, and
responsible caretakers and parents also will help to combat the
persistent gender-based expectations of women that exist in the
domestic sphere.259 On a broad scale, as legal and societal recognition
that men are fully capable of undertaking the wide range of activities
associated with successful childrearing increases, the likelihood that
different-sex couples will automatically resort to traditional genderbased caretaking roles and expectations when they have children will
continue to decrease.260 As caretaking becomes less synonymous with
motherhood, different-sex couples will increasingly be left to make
decisions about domestic responsibilities based upon considerations
other than gender. Importantly, dismantling gender-based caretaking
expectations within the domestic sphere will promote the dismantling
of gender-based caretaking expectations in the workplace and vice
versa.261 Although there is still significant progress to be made, women
today are gaining increasing equality in both the workplace and
domestic sphere. Laws that serve to facilitate and normalize male
caretaking, such as those that advance parentage establishment for male

256 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2330 (“[M]ale same-sex couples disrupt norms of
both heterosexuality and gender that have structured family relationships. By forming
a family that excludes a mother, these men position fathers as primary parents —
assuming the social role traditionally demanded of women as a matter of biology.”).
257 See Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 154, at 363 (quoting Nev. Dep’t of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003)).
258 See id.
259 See supra notes 195–97, 251–54 and accompanying text.
260 As laws and societal views regarding gender equality have advanced, different-sex
couples have become increasingly more egalitarian with regard to responsibilities for
childcare and housework. See Modern Parenthood: Roles of Moms and Dads Converge as they
Balance Work and Family, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.
org/2013/03/14/modern-parenthood-roles-of-moms-and-dads-converge-as-they-balancework-and-family/ [http://perma.cc/7DXN-GCGE] [hereinafter Modern Parenthood].
261 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 112 (2005) (“[W]e can now see
home and employment as complementary but interlocking spaces. Changing the rules
and norms in one affects the other . . . .”).
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same-sex couples, will help to ensure that the momentum toward
women’s equality continues.262
Laws that reflect the recognition that children can thrive under the
care of men also can help to disrupt the assumptions and stereotypes
that harm and confine men. Today, it is increasingly common for men
to “want to escape the bonds of the breadwinner stereotype so that they
can be more connected and involved fathers and partners who equally
share the load at home with their spouses.”263 Men are taking on
significantly more caretaking and housework than in the past,264 and
the percentage of fathers who serve as stay-at-home parents also is on
the rise.265 In a recent Pew Research Poll, fathers were almost as likely
as mothers to indicate that they would rather be raising their children
than working.266 Additionally, although “[f]athers have nearly tripled
their time with [their] children since 1965,” almost half of the fathers
surveyed indicated that they felt the amount of time they were currently
able to spend with their children was still not enough.267
Despite these significant changes in men’s caretaking attitudes and
behaviors, men who engage in substantial caretaking continue to face
discrimination and stigmatization. Notably, “[m]en who treat
caregiving as a primary concern face discrimination and hostility in the
workplace.”268 For example, men who seek to utilize family leave or
flexible work policies to engage in caretaking activities report being met
with skepticism and retaliation in the workplace.269 Similarly, men who
262

Cf. Modern Parenthood, supra note 260.
McGowan, supra note 245, at 1200 (citing BRAD HARRINGTON, FRED VAN DEUSEN
& BETH HUMBERD, THE NEW DAD: CARING, COMMITTED AND CONFLICTED 12 chart 5
(2011)).
264 See Modern Parenthood, supra note 260.
265 Gretchen Livingston, Stay-at-Home Moms and Dads Account for About One-in-Five
U.S. Parents, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/09/24/stay-at-home-moms-and-dads-account-for-about-one-in-five-u-sparents/ [http://perma.cc/RA4L-X3Z6] (“However, the long-term uptick in dads at
home is not driven solely by economic factors. The modest increase is apparent even
after excluding those who were home due to unemployment. Furthermore, a growing
share of stay-at-home fathers say they are home specifically to care for their home or
family, suggesting that changing gender roles may be at play.”).
266 Modern Parenthood, supra note 260.
267 Id.
268 Kelli K. García, The Gender Bind: Men as Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2012).
269 See Dara E. Purvis, Trump, Gender Rebels, and Masculinities, 54 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 423, 432 (2019) (“There are scores of examples of employers who punish male
employees for taking on caregiving responsibilities.”); Jocelyn Tillisch, Title IX and
Gender Stereotype Theory: Protecting Students from Parental Status Discrimination, 42
263
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seek to return to work after leaving the workforce to care for their
children also report experiencing discrimination.270 Moreover, the
stigmatization and discrimination experienced by men who engage in
primary caretaking is not confined to the workplace. For example, as
discussed above, society views stay-at-home fathers as less competent
than stay-at-home mothers.271 Furthermore, while a large segment of
the population continues to believe that the ideal situation for children
is to have a mother who stays at home part- or full-time, the percentage
of people who believe the same about fathers is drastically lower.272 The
view that a man’s role is to provide financially for his family lingers, and
men who serve as primary caretakers report being met with discomfort,
disapproval, and judgment as they move through the world.273
It is likely that the adoption of laws and policies that serve to support
and normalize families in which primary caretaking responsibilities are
undertaken by men will lead to more men taking on caretaking
responsibilities.274 As male caretaking becomes increasingly common,
the stereotypes and stigmatization that plague male caretakers will
further dissipate, and employers and society at large will be less likely
to perceive male caretaking as suspicious or improper. In sum, laws that
reflect a recognition that caretaking is not a gender-specific activity,
including those that facilitate the establishment of parentage in male
same-sex couples, collectively will help in the ongoing efforts to free
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1223, 1223 (2019) (“Fathers face different stereotypes, including that
they are uncommitted . . . employees when they take family leave, because childcare is
still regarded as a feminine role.”); see also García, supra note 268, at 10 (“Research on
attitudes toward male caregivers suggests that men correctly perceive that they will be
judged more harshly than women for using family leave policies.”).
270 Maureen Minehan, Don’t Stigmatize Stay-at-Home Dads, HR WIRE (Oct. 20, 2003);
Eve Tahmincioglu, Return to Work Not Easy for Stay-at-Home Dads, NBC NEWS (Aug.
30, 2007, 7:26 AM EST), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19977348/ns/business-careers/t/
return-work-not-easy-stay-at-home-dads/#.XUMyOehKi70 [https://perma.cc/QBP2U9MV].
271 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
272 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
273 See Jason Beaubien, Stay-at-Home Dads Still Struggle with Diapers, Drool, Stigma and
Isolation, NPR (June 17, 2018, 5:37 PM EST), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/06/17/619557786/stay-at-home-dads-still-struggle-with-diapers-drool-stigmaand-isolation [https://perma.cc/JB66-AHH7]; Caitlin Fitzsimmons, Stigma and Suspicion: The
Extra Burden of Stay-at-Home Dads, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 2, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/life-and-relationships/stigma-and-suspicion-the-extraburden-of-stay-at-home-dads-20180901-p5014p.html [https://perma.cc/US98-ZEF7];
Jennifer Medina, Housewives, Try This for Desperation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/22/nyregion/housewives-try-this-for-desperation.html
[https://perma.cc/R2EY-N947].
274 See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
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both women and men from the confines of traditional gender roles and
the significant harms that stem therefrom.
V.

PROPOSAL: EXTENDING NON-ADOPTIVE MARRIAGE-BASED AVENUES
TO ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE TO MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES

At first glance, it may seem that efforts aimed at providing parentage
to married male same-sex couples who conceive children via surrogacy
should focus exclusively on advancing surrogacy statutes that recognize
intended parents as legal parents regardless of gender or biological
connection to the child. While this is undoubtedly an extremely
important goal, extending marriage-based avenues of establishing
parentage to male same-sex couples is also an essential step for attaining
equality for male same-sex couples in the parentage realm. Although
the first surrogacy agreement in the United States occurred in 1976,275
today many states still lack statutes or appellate case law governing
surrogacy and only a minority of states have surrogacy laws recognizing
both members of a married couple as legal parents in situations in which
the child is conceived using donor ova and sperm from one of the
intended parents.276 The hesitancy of states to address surrogacy and
the vast disparity in the approaches of the states that do have laws
governing surrogacy make it essential to advance other methods of
establishing parentage for male same-sex couples while simultaneously
seeking to advance inclusive state surrogacy laws.
When it comes to facilitating parentage establishment for same-sex
couples, a number of states may find it easier or more palatable to
extend to same-sex couples the longstanding avenues of establishing
parentage that already exist, as opposed to creating new avenues of
parentage establishment, such as surrogacy-based avenues.277 For
example, states have extended longstanding marriage-based avenues of
establishing parentage to female same-sex couples simply by adopting
gender neutral language to refer to the person who is deemed a parent

275 Keith J. Hey, Assisted Conception and Surrogacy — Unfinished Business, 26 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 775, 787 (1993).
276 See supra notes 89, 103–05 and accompanying text.
277 See NeJaime, supra note 18, at 2342 (“Ideally, legislators would accept primary
responsibility for reforming parentage law . . . [b]ut lawmakers in many states have been
slow to respond to shifts in family formation made possible by ART – even when urged
to do so by judges. Consequently, courts are routinely asked to apply existing parentage
principles to new and unforeseen situations. In many states, courts can rely on existing
family law principles to apply the marital presumption in ways that promote equality
. . . .”).
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on the basis of their marriage to the individual who gave birth.278 In
addition, even when same- or different-sex couples utilize surrogacy in
a state that does not recognize the surrogacy agreement itself as
establishing legal parentage for the intended parents, in many instances
genetic intended parents have been able to use well-established
genetics-based avenues to obtain legal parentage.279 It is likely that in a
number of the states that lack surrogacy laws providing parentage to
male same-sex couples, the strategy of extending longstanding avenues
of establishing parentage, such as the existing marriage-based avenues,
will provide the quickest path to achieving non-adoptive parentage
establishment for male same-sex couples.
Among the states that do not have surrogacy laws providing parentage
to the non-biological intended parent when conception occurs using
sperm from their spouse and donor ova, the ease of extending marriagebased parentage establishment avenues to male same-sex couples will
depend on the state’s approach to the disestablishment of legal
parentage for surrogates. As discussed above, in most states, when the
surrogacy agreement is not recognized as establishing the intended
parents as legal parents, non-adoptive disestablishment of a surrogate’s
legal parentage is allowed only when there is a genetic intended mother
seeking to establish maternity — which would not usually exist in the
context of male same-sex couples.280 In a couple of these states,
however, the surrogate’s legal parentage can be disestablished through
non-adoptive avenues even when there is no genetic intended mother
seeking to establish maternity.281 In these states, extending marriagebased parentage establishment avenues to male same-sex couples will
be the most straightforward and will require the least amount of reform
to existing laws.
Maryland is one of these minority jurisdictions. Despite rendering
surrogacy agreements unenforceable, Maryland allows for the
disestablishment of the surrogate’s legal maternity through geneticsbased avenues similar to those applicable to paternity disestablishment
when a child is conceived using sperm from an intended parent and
donor ova (meaning there is no genetic intended mother).282 In In re
Roberto d.B., an unmarried man and a gestational surrogate entered into
a surrogacy agreement through which a child was to be conceived using
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279
280
281
282

See supra notes 60–62, 71–73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 282–90 and accompanying text.
In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 121 (Md. 2007).
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the man’s sperm and donor ova.283 Against the parties’ wishes, the
surrogate’s name was listed on the child’s birth certificate along with the
biological father’s name, and the trial court rejected the parties’ petition
seeking the issuance of an accurate birth certificate that listed only the
name of the biological father.284 The Maryland Court of Appeals held
that pursuant to equal protection principles, women must be able to
utilize the genetics-based parentage disestablishment procedures
available to men.285 As a result, the surrogate could disestablish her
maternity on the basis of her lack of genetic connection to the child
even through there was no genetic intended mother seeking to establish
maternity.286
Iowa allows for the disestablishment of the surrogate’s legal parentage
in this context through a different avenue. Although Iowa law does not
allow the non-biological intended parent to establish parentage through
enforcement of the surrogacy agreement when a child is conceived
using sperm from the other intended parent and donor ova, it
nonetheless allows for the surrogate’s legal parentage to be
disestablished through enforcement of the surrogacy agreement in this
situation.287 In P.M. v. T.B., the intended parents, a married couple,
sought to enforce the surrogacy agreement after the surrogate and her
husband refused to deliver the child, who was conceived using sperm
from the intended father and donor ova.288 The Iowa Supreme Court
held that a “gestational surrogacy contract is legally enforceable in favor
of the intended, biological father against a surrogate mother and her
husband who are not the child’s genetic parents.”289 While the court
indicated that the non-biological intended parent, the biological father’s
wife, would need to pursue adoption in order to establish legal
parentage, enforcement of the surrogacy agreement served to establish
parentage in the biological father and to disestablish parentage in the
surrogate even though there was no genetic intended mother seeking to
establish maternity.290
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Id. at 117.
Id. at 118-19.
285 See id. at 122-26.
286 See id.
287 See P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 536 (Iowa 2018) (“Adoption laws shall be
followed to reestablish the certificate of live birth by establishing the nonbiological
parent on the certificate of live birth pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 600.”).
288 Id. at 524-25.
289 Id. at 525.
290 See id. at 536 (“When the intended mother is not the egg donor, she may replace
the birth mother on a new certificate of live birth through a formal adoption.”).
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Application of marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to
male same-sex couples will be relatively straightforward in jurisdictions
like Maryland and Iowa that, despite not recognizing the surrogacy
agreement as establishing parentage in the non-biological intended
parent when a child is conceived using sperm from the other intended
parent and donor ova, nonetheless allow for the disestablishment of the
surrogate’s legal parentage through genetics- or surrogacy-based
avenues. As an initial matter, in these jurisdictions, it is not necessary
to relegate the establishment of parentage for the biological father’s
spouse (the non-biological intended parent) to the adoption realm.
When legal parentage conclusively attaches to an individual based upon
the act of giving birth, generally it can only be voluntarily terminated
through formal adoption procedures.291 However, if the legal parentage
presumed based upon the act of giving birth is rebuttable through
genetics- or surrogacy-based avenues, the surrogate whose legal
parentage is rebutted will no longer have parental rights that must be
formally terminated.
Moreover, in these jurisdictions, the concern that applying marriagebased parentage presumptions to the spouses of biological fathers will
result in the simultaneous establishment of legal parentage in more than
two individuals does not pose a major problem. If the surrogate’s legal
maternity is disestablished, there will be only one legal parent, the
biological father, and thus extending marriage-based presumptions to
his spouse at that point will not result in the child having more than
two legal parents. In fact, if marriage-based parentage presumptions do
not apply to the biological father’s spouse, the child will have only one
legally recognized parent when the surrogate’s maternity is
disestablished. Overall, extending marriage-based avenues of parentage
establishment to male same-sex couples will be a relatively simple and
straightforward undertaking in these jurisdictions and will promote
important government interests in identifying two legal parents for
every child from the earliest possible point.292
The decision in In re Maria-lrene D., one of the only reported cases
(perhaps the only reported case) to date in which a court applied a
marriage-based parentage presumption to the same-sex spouse of the
child’s biological father,293 demonstrates the straightforward nature of
291

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 104.
293 At least one court has applied the marital presumption to the different-sex spouse
of a child’s biological father. In In re S.N.V., the Colorado Court of Appeals held that
the marital presumption of parentage applied to a woman who was not genetically
connected to the child, but was married to the child’s biological father at the time of the
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applying marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male
same-sex couples in situations where the surrogate’s legal parentage has
been disestablished.294 In In re Maria-lrene D., a married male same-sex
couple jointly executed a surrogacy agreement, and the surrogate later
gave birth to a child conceived from donor ova and sperm from one
member of the couple.295 The couple commenced a judicial proceeding
in Missouri through which they sought and obtained a judicial
determination that neither the ova donor nor the surrogate had parental
rights.296 During the proceeding, the court awarded the spouse whose
sperm had been used to conceive the child, “as the genetic father, . . .
‘sole and exclusive custody’ of the child.”297
After the couple separated, the biological father’s new partner adopted
the child.298 The biological father’s former spouse sought to vacate the
adoption on the grounds that, as a legal parent, he was entitled to notice
of the adoption and an opportunity to be heard, neither of which he had
received.299 In upholding the Family Court’s decision to vacate the
adoption, the New York intermediate appellate court held that the
biological father’s marriage to his former spouse at the time the child
was born gave rise to the presumption under state law that a child born
into a marriage is the legitimate child of both spouses, which bestowed
parental rights on the former spouse.300 In this case, because the
surrogate’s parental rights had been disestablished, the court could
apply a marriage-based presumption of parentage to the biological
father’s spouse without the need for an adoption proceeding to
terminate the surrogate’s rights and without fear that application of the
presumption would result in the biological father, the biological father’s
spouse, the surrogate, and the surrogate’s spouse (if any) all being
entitled to legal parentage.
The availability of procedures for rebutting and disestablishing the
surrogate’s presumed legal parentage creates a clear path to extending
child’s conception and birth. In re S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147, 151 (Colo. App. 2011). For an
example of a decision that reached the opposite conclusion, see Amy G. v. M.W., 47
Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 304-05 (Cal. App. 2006) (holding that while the marital presumption
of paternity could be applied in a gender-neutral manner in some contexts, it could not
be applied to a biological father’s wife when there was a competing claim of maternity
from the child’s biological mother).
294 See In re Maria-Irene D., 153 A.D.3d 1203, 1205 (App. Div. 2017).
295 Id. at 1203-04.
296 See id. at 1204.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 1205.
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marriage-based parentage presumptions to male same-sex couples.
Since most states do not allow for the rebuttal and disestablishment of
the gestational surrogate’s parentage when there is no genetic intended
mother,301 reform must start with creating avenues for rebutting and
disestablishing the presumed legal parentage that attaches based upon
the act of giving birth in situations involving donor ova. While
eliminating the presumption of parentage that attaches based upon the
act of giving birth is another option that would facilitate the application
of marriage-based avenues of parentage establishment to male same-sex
couples, it is safe to assume that most states will continue to presume
an individual’s legal parentage based upon the act of giving birth.
Although in modern times gestation and genetics no longer necessarily
coincide, this longstanding practice not only reflects a recognition of
the critically important, substantial caregiving work and nurturing
undertaken by individuals who gestate and give birth to children,302 it
also bestows parentage to an individual who, in addition to gestating
the child, is the child’s genetic and intended parent in the vast majority
of instances.303 Consequently, efforts to extend marriage-based
presumptions to male same-sex couples should focus on adopting
procedures for rebutting and disestablishing the legal parentage that the
law presumes based on the act of giving birth, as opposed to eliminating
presumptions of parentage stemming from the act of giving birth.
In determining how to structure the rules governing the rebuttal and
disestablishment of the presumed legal maternity that attaches based
upon the act of giving birth, it is important to consider the processes
that states already have in place for the rebuttal and disestablishment of
presumed legal paternity. For example, in the context of the marital
presumption of parentage, rebuttal of the husband’s presumed paternity
requires, at a minimum, proof that the man and the child do not share
a genetic tie.304 If the child is conceived via assisted reproduction,
considerations relating to both genetics and intent will factor into
rebuttal of the husband’s presumed parentage. Specifically, although
rebuttal of the husband’s presumed parentage will still require proof of
a lack of genetic tie between the husband and child, the rebuttal action
will fail if the husband consented to his wife’s use of assisted
reproduction with the intent to be the resulting child’s parent in
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See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
Appleton, supra note 44, at 270 (noting “the unique and indispensable nurturing
role played by the woman who provides gestation”).
303 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 3, at 115 n.83.
304 See Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 38, at 243.
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compliance with the state’s spousal consent to assisted reproduction
law.305
Notably, many states have adopted provisions in their parentage
codes indicating that, to the extent reasonable, the standards governing
paternity determinations should apply to maternity determinations.306
As the court explained in In re Roberto d.B., equal protection principles
support extending to women the paternity disestablishment procedures
available to men.307 Indeed, a number of states have already applied
paternity establishment principles in the maternity establishment
context by allowing genetic intended mothers to establish their legal
maternity and rebut and disestablish the legal maternity of the surrogate
through genetics-based avenues akin to those that apply in paternity
determinations.308 It is clear that adopting methods for the rebuttal and
disestablishment of maternity will not require states to create a wholly
novel set of rules governing parentage determinations; rather, existing
laws and procedures can be reformed and restructured to provide
avenues for maternity rebuttal and disestablishment.
Genetics-focused avenues present a logical, well-established method
for rebutting and disestablishing presumed legal parentage, and such
avenues should form a core component of procedures governing the
rebuttal and disestablishment of the presumed legal parentage that
attaches to an individual based upon the act of giving birth. However, it
is important that genetics are not the sole consideration in actions to
rebut the presumption of legal parentage that attaches to an individual
based upon the act of giving birth. This is because it is not only
surrogates who carry and give birth to children with whom they lack a
genetic tie. Intended mothers who cannot conceive children using their
own ova may utilize donor ova and sperm from a partner or donor to
become pregnant.309 In this situation, a standard that allowed for the
rebuttal and disestablishment of the legal parentage of the individual
who gave birth solely on the basis of their lack of genetic ties to the
child would be problematic. As a result, notions of intent, along with
genetics-based considerations, must play a role in standards governing
the rebuttal and disestablishment of the legal parentage that attaches to
an individual based upon the act of giving birth.
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See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
307 See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 122-26 (Md. 2007).
308 See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
309 See
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Eggs,
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(Apr.
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2017),
https://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/donor-eggs/ [https://perma.cc/FRM2-AKUH].
306

2021]

After Marriage Equality

1567

The standard for rebutting and disestablishing the presumed legal
parentage that attaches to an individual based upon the act of giving
birth should require proof both that the individual lacks a genetic tie to
the child and that the individual and the intended parent(s) undertook
conception with the intent and understanding that the child’s intended
parent(s) would be the child’s sole legal parent(s). The most obvious
evidence of the requisite intent would be a surrogacy agreement entered
into between the individual who gave birth and the intended parent(s).
The state would not have to recognize the surrogacy agreement itself as
establishing or disestablishing any of the parties’ legal parentage.
Instead, the surrogacy agreement would serve as persuasive evidence of
the intent component of the proposed standard for rebutting and
disestablishing the presumed legal parentage of the individual who gave
birth. In defining the intent element of the proposed rebuttal standard,
states would be free to adopt the type of procedural and substantive
requirements for establishing the existence of meaningful, informed
consent that already exist within many states’ laws governing parentage
establishment in the assisted reproduction context.310
Establishing grounds for rebuttal and disestablishment of maternity
that combine genetics- and intent-based considerations is not a major
leap from existing practices. As discussed above, even when the
surrogacy agreement is not enforceable, in many states the surrogate’s
parentage can be rebutted and disestablished when there is a genetic
intended mother seeking to establish maternity.311 When this occurs,
the disestablishment of the surrogate’s parentage is based upon notions
of both genetics and intent — the individual who gave birth lacks a
genetic tie to the child and the individual whose ova were used to
conceive the child intended to be the child’s parent, while the individual
who gave birth did not. In these cases, despite not recognizing the
enforceability of the surrogacy agreement, the court identifies the
individual who gave birth as a “surrogate,” meaning the court perceives
the situation as one in which, at the time of conception, the parties had
the mutual intent for the intended parent(s), and not the individual who
gave birth, to be the child’s legal parent(s).312 If the individual who gave
310 See, e.g., supra notes 68, 91–95 and accompanying text (describing various
procedural and substantive requirements that states employ in the assisted reproduction
context).
311 See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
312 See, e.g., Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(referring throughout the opinion to the individual who gave birth as “the surrogate”);
Doe v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (describing the
individual who gave birth as “a gestational surrogate”); J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d
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birth conceived the child using donor ova with the intent to be the
child’s parent and there were no intended parents with whom the
individual had entered into a surrogacy agreement or something akin to
it, her maternity likely could not be disestablished based solely upon
her lack of genetic tie to the child.313 Thus, many states’ current
standards governing the rebuttal and disestablishment of maternity in
situations involving unenforceable surrogacy agreements consider not
only genetics but also intent. In addition to being a logical extension of
existing standards governing maternity rebuttal and disestablishment,
the proposed standard will remedy the deeply problematic current
situation wherein something as important as the gestational surrogate’s
parentage often hinges upon whether the intended parents utilized ova
from the intended mother or a donor.314
It is possible that some states, in an effort to acknowledge the essential
work undertaken by the individual who carries and gives birth to a
child, would seek to structure maternity rebuttal actions such that only
the surrogate could seek to rebut and disestablish her legal parentage.
This would at least alleviate the problem of surrogates having legal
parentage attach to them against their wishes. Furthermore, even a
restricted rebuttal avenue such as this would help the vast majority of
married male same-sex couples who conceive via surrogacy, since in
most cases both the surrogate and the intended parents wish to establish
the intended parents as the child’s legal parents.315 However, a rule
providing that only the person who gave birth may seek to rebut and
disestablish their legal parentage would place intended parents in an
extremely risky position, leaving them without adequate protections in
situations in which the surrogate changed her mind after entering into
the surrogacy agreement. Moreover, the requirements of the proposed
standard — the lack of genetic tie between the surrogate and child and
the parties’ undertaking of the child’s conception with the intent and
understanding that the child’s intended parent(s) would be the child’s
sole legal parent(s) — do not include that the surrogate’s intent remain
static following conception.
After establishing procedures for the rebuttal and disestablishment of
the presumed legal parentage that attaches to an individual based upon
1268, 1270 (D. Utah 2002) (“W.K.J. agreed to serve as a gestational carrier surrogate
for a child to be conceived in vitro by J.R. and M.R.”).
313 This assumes that the ova were provided by the donor in compliance with the
jurisdiction’s gamete donor non-paternity laws. See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward,
supra note 3, at 121-22 (discussing gamete donor non-paternity laws).
314 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
315 See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
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the act of giving birth, states will need to amend their existing marriagebased avenues of establishing parentage to specify that the avenues will
apply to the spouses of biological, legally recognized fathers in instances
when the legal parentage of the individual who gave birth is rebutted
and disestablished through the relevant procedures. Specifically, marital
presumption of parentage laws will need to be amended to reflect that
if the child is born or conceived during marriage, the spouse of a
biological, legally recognized father will be presumed to be the child’s
parent when the parentage of the individual who gave birth has been
rebutted and disestablished through the requisite procedures. Similarly,
consent to assisted reproduction laws will need to be amended to reflect
that when a child is conceived through assisted reproduction, the
spouse of the child’s biological, legally recognized father is the child’s
parent if the spouse consented to the biological father’s use of assisted
reproduction and the parentage of the individual who gave birth has
been rebutted and disestablished. In addition, to avoid confusion, laws
setting forth marriage-based parentage presumptions should specify
that they are not applicable to the spouse of an individual whose
presumed legal maternity based upon the act of giving birth has been
rebutted and disestablished. Finally, it is important that individuals in
same-sex marriages who qualify as legal parents pursuant to the
marriage-based avenues available in their state nonetheless obtain court
orders reflecting their parental status in order to ensure that other states
will recognize their legal parentage.316
It is important to note that this proposal also would open the door for
the extension of existing non-marital avenues of establishing parentage
to male same-sex couples who conceive a child via surrogacy using
donor ova and sperm from one member of the couple. For example, if
the surrogate’s maternity is rebutted and disestablished through the
relevant procedures, statutes that provide legal parentage to a nonmarital partner who consents to an individual’s use of assisted
reproduction to become pregnant could be extended to a non-marital
partner who consents to the biological father’s use of surrogacy to have
a child.317 Similarly, voluntary acknowledgment of parentage
procedures also could be extended to the biological father’s non-marital
316 See Appleton, supra note 44, at 290 n.371 (explaining that “the full faith and
credit owed to other states’ laws . . . permits the second forum to refuse recognition
based on its own public policy, [while] the full faith and credit owed to other states’
judgments and decrees . . . leaves no room for nonrecognition based on public policy”).
317 See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 3:3 (identifying jurisdictions that have statutes
providing parentage based upon consent to a spouse or partner’s use of assisted
reproduction that are gender neutral and do not require the parties to be married).
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partner.318 With the surrogate’s maternity disestablished, there will be
no need for an adoption procedure to terminate the surrogate’s legal
rights and no reason to fear that the extension of non-marital avenues
of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples will necessarily lead
to the simultaneous establishment of legal parentage in more than two
individuals.
Finally, while this Article has focused on providing male same-sex
couples with access to non-adoptive methods of establishing parentage,
it is important to note that the proposal also will aid in the
establishment of parentage for non-biological intended mothers in the
surrogacy context. As discussed above, when a different-sex married
couple enters into a gestational surrogacy agreement in which a child is
conceived using sperm from the intended father and ova from a gamete
donor, only a minority of jurisdictions recognize the intended mother
as a legal parent.319 Consequently, in most jurisdictions, a nonbiological intended mother must pursue costly, invasive adoption
procedures in order to establish herself as the legal parent of a child
conceived via surrogacy using sperm from her husband and donor ova.
Under the proposal, however, upon rebuttal of the surrogate’s legal
parentage, the spouse of the child’s biological, legally recognized father,
regardless of their gender, will be able to establish legal parentage
through marriage-based avenues. As a result, the proposal will provide
critical parentage rights for both same- and different-sex couples who
conceive children via surrogacy using sperm from one member of the
couple and donor ova.
CONCLUSION
The exclusion of male same-sex couples from non-adoptive marriagebased avenues of establishing parentage is extremely problematic. It is
essential to challenge the harmful, inaccurate assumptions and beliefs
that underlie this exclusion, as neither gender nor sexual orientation is
determinative of an individual’s parenting abilities. Moreover, the
conclusive provision of parentage based upon the act of giving birth,
which presents a significant barrier to the extension of marriage-based
avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples, is an
outdated concept that is in need of reform. Establishing laws that permit
rebuttal and disestablishment of the presumed parentage that attaches
to an individual based upon the act of giving birth in appropriate
circumstances and extending marriage-based parentage presumptions
318
319

See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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to the spouse of the child’s biological, legally recognized father when
rebuttal occurs, will advance a more equitable and effective legal
framework for the establishment of parentage. In addition, laws that
facilitate parentage for male same-sex couples will help to dismantle the
persistent gender-based stereotypes around caretaking that harm and
confine women and men both in the workplace and in the domestic
sphere.

